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cia' District Court - Kootenai

Time: 03:36 PM
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User: HARWOOD

ROA Report
Case: CV-2009-0002S16 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Douglas Stafford, eta/. vs. Kootenai County, eta/.

Douglas Stafford, Michelle Stafford vs. Kootenai County, Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Elmer R (Rick)
Currie, Rich Piazza, Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

Judge

3/27/2009

NCOC

VICTORIN

New Case Filed - Other Claims

VICTORIN

Filing: R2 Appeal or petiton for judical review, or John T. Mitchell
cross-appeal or cross-petition, from Commission
Boardl or body to the District Court Paid by:
John Magnuson Receipt number: 0841126
Dated: 3/27/2009 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For:

John T. Mitchell

3/31/2009

SUMI

MCCORD

NO Summons Issued

John T. Mitchell

4/27/2009

PETN

LEU

First Amended Petition For Judicial Review

John T. Mitchell

5/22/2009

NOTC

CRUMPACKER Notice of Estimate of Cost for Preparation of
Transcript & Agency Record

John T. Mitchell

5/26/2009

NOTC

HUFFMAN

Notice of Estimate of Cost for Preparation of
Transcript & Agency Record

John T. Mitchell

6/16/2009

AFFD

HUFFMAN

Affidavit of Sandi Gilbertson in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell
for Conditional Order of Dismissal

MOTN

HUFFMAN

Motion for Conditional Order of Dismissal

John T. Mitchell

6/18/2009

NOTC

HUFFMAN

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Conditional
Order of Dismissal

John T. Mitchell

7/212009

NOTC

CRUMPACKER Notice of Lodging of Transcript & Agency Record John T. Mitchell

7/17/2009

NOTC

BAXLEY

Notice Of Settlement And Filing Of Transcript
And Agency Record

John T. Mitchell

8/3/2009

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/24/200904:00 PM)

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order for Hearing and Setting of Briefing
Schedule on Administrative Appeal

John T. Mitchell

9/1712009

BRIE

BAXLEY

Plaintiffs' 1 Petitioners' Opening Brief On Appeal

John T. Mitchell

9/21/2009

FILE

HARPER

*************File No.2 Created - Expando********

John T. Mitchell

FILE

HARPER

*************File NO.3 Created - Expando*******

John T. Mitchell

FILE

HARPER

***********File No.4 Created - Expando*******

John T. Mitchell

10/9/2009

BRFR

BAXLEY

Brief Of Respondent

John T. Mitchell

11/19/2009

BRIE

VICTORIN

Plaintiffs'IPetitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal

John T. Mitchell

11/24/2009

DCHH

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held John T. Mitchell
on 11/24/2009 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Carrie Veare

12/212009

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal Affirming Decisions

John T. Mitchell

12/3/2009

STAT

CLAUSEN

Case status changed: closed

John T. Mitchell

SHEDLOCK

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John T. Mitchell
to Supreme Court Paid by: Magnuson, John F.
(attorney for Stafford, Douglas) Receipt number:
0001602 Dated: 1/13/2010 Amount: $101.00
(Check) For: Stafford, Douglas (plaintiff) and
Stafford, Michelle (plaintiff)

1113/2010
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District Court - Kootenai

User: HARWOOD

ROA Report
Case: CV-2009-0002516 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Douglas Stafford, etal. vs. Kootenai County, etal.

Douglas Stafford, Michelle Stafford vs. Kootenai County, Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Elmer R (Rick)
Currie. Rich Piazza, Todd Tondee
Judge

Date

Code

User

1/13/2010

BNDC

SHEDLOCK

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1603 Dated
1/13/2010 for 100.00)

John T. Mitchell

STAT

SHEDLOCK

Case status changed: Closed pending clerk
action

John T. Mitchell

FILE

SHEDLOCK

New File Created

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

SHEDLOCK

Notice Of Appeal

John T. Mitchell

CERT

SHEDLOCK

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

John T. Mitchell

1/14/2010

*****File #5*****
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JOf-IN F. MAGNUSON
Attotneyat Law
P.O. B(JX 2350
J 250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
)\)0
Fax: (208) 667-0500
ISB #4270
SUMMONS ISSUED
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

MAR g 7 2UUB

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE
STAFFORD, husband and wife,

CASE NO.:

\N

a~-

:251 \a

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
vs.

FEE CATEGORY: R.2
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,

FEE: $88.00

Defendants/Respondents.

COME NO W the Plaintiffs/Petitioners named above, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, by and
through their attorney of record, Jolm F. Magnuson, by way of this "Petition for Judicial Review"
against the Defendants/Respondents named above, and aver and allege as set forth herein.
Petitioners appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Plalming Act, I.e. §67-6501, et. seq., including
but not limited to I. C. §67-6521. Petitioners further appeal pursuant to the Idaho Administrative
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. ASSIGNED f0.
JUDGE f\t1JTCl-IELL

Procedure Act, I.C. §67-520 1, et. seq., including but not limited to I.c. §67-S270. This appeal is also
made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84.

I. PARTIES.
1.

Plaintiffs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford are the owners of certain real

property located in unincorporated Kootenai County. Said property is identified as Kootenai County
Parcel No. 0-14S0-001-01S-A, Lots IS and 16, Block 1, Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates (amended).
Said property consists of littoral property on Lake Coeur d'Alene.

Plaintiffs/Petitioners are

collectively referred to herein as "Stafford."
2.

Defendant/Respondent Kootenai County is a political subdivision of the State of

Idaho acting by and through Defendants/Respondents CUlTie, Piazza, and Tondee (all members of
the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners). Defendant/Respondent is referred to herein as
"Kootenai County."

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.
3.

This Petition for review is filed pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e.

§67-6501, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C. §67-6521, as well as the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act, I.c. §67-520 1, including but not limited to I.C. §67-S270. Jurisdiction and venue
are proper pursuant to Idaho Law, including the foregoing authorities as well as I.R.c.P. 84.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

In July of 1999, Stafford submitted a site plan in conjunction with site improvements

and the construction of a home on the Stafford property. The property had previously been disturbed
through third-patiy logging operations and development, including activities within twenty-five (2S)
feet of the ordinary high watermark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur d' Alene (elevation 2128 (WWP
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datum)).
5.

The site disturbance permit was issued in conjunction with the site plan submitted

in July of 1999. Construction thereafter progressed. In March 2000, a Certificate of Occupancy was
issued to Stafford.
6.

At the time Stafford submitted the July 1999 site plan, and the County thereafter

issued the requisite site disturbance permit, the County's Site Disturbance Ordinance was
denominated Ordinance 251.
7.

In the spring of 2001, Stafford personally made inquiry of the Kootenai County

Planning Department regarding his ability to vegetate within the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone
from the OHWM. He was advised that "re-greening" was not a problem. He was fmiher advised
that "re-:greening" would not require any permit or approval from Kootenai County.
9.

At the time Stafford purchased the property, the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone

from the OHWM, as described above, included native sands and basalt rock. The same is true both
then and today with respect to adjacent property located below the OHWM of2128.
10.

Following Stafford's contact with the Kootenai County Planning Department, in

2001, Stafford placed natural basalt rocks near the shore as a natural bulkhead. The rocks are
indigenous to the area.
II.

At the same time, Stafford also replaced some naturally occurring sand that had been

dissipated by boat wakes and prior 100 year flooding incidents in 1996 and 1997.
12.

At about the same time, Stafford also placed some grass outside and inside the

twenty-five (25) foot setback zone, and area that had previously been occupied by both native grasses
and noxious weeds.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 3
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13.

Stafford made no effort to hide any of these "improvements," the same being

implicitly if not explicitly condoned or approved by Kootenai County.
14.

During the intervening five (5) years following installation of the improvements,

Kootenai County took numerous pictures of the Stafford property, pictures that it retained in its
actual possession. Kootenai County took no enforcement action of any kind or nature during this
five-year period.
15.

In 2005, the Staffords submitted a second site plan. At that time, Stafford intended

to construct an addition to the home first constructed under the July 1999 permit.
16.

The site plan depicted a barbecue pit, showing the same to traverse the actual twenty-

five (25) foot setback line. Kootenai County reviewed the plan, signed off on the plan, and approved
the same.
17.

In conjunction with the site improvements sought in 2005, Kootenai County

inspected the Stafford property. No objections were raised by Kootenai County as to any conditions
extant on the Stafford property.
18.

The Staffords undertook construction as authorized by the 2005 permit so as to add

an addition to their home. Throughout the construction process, numerous inspections were
undertaken by various agents of Kootenai County.

Those agents either viewed, or had the

opportunity to view, any improvements previously made by the Staffords within said twenty-five
(25) foot setback zone. No objections were raised.
19.

In August of 2007, the Staffords called for a final inspection in order to obtain their

Certificate of Occupancy. The framing inspector advised them that they would not obtain a
Certificate of Occupancy due to alleged site disturbance violations.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 4
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20.

The Staffords immediately initiated contact with Kootenai County. The Staffords

suggested that the parties resolve the issue before the impending holiday season of 2007. They
received no response from Kootenai County.
21.

The Staffords renewed their suggestion that the parties attempt to resolve the issue

prior to the holiday season of2007 so that they could get a Certificate of Occupancy. They received
no response from Kootenai County.
22.

In January of 2008, Kootenai County made contact with the Staffords, having

previously ignored their amicable efforts to meet and resolve the issue, and advised them that
Kootenai County would refuse to issue the Staffords a Certificate of Occupancy for their addition
based upon alleged violations (under the Site Disturbance Ordinance) that had absolutely nothing
to do with the addition to the home.
23.

In order to placate Kootenai County, the Staffords submitted a proposed site

remediation plan. The site remediation plan recommended leaving the basalt boulders and sand in
place as the removal of the same would cause a larger disturbance than simply leaving them as is.
Kootenai County refused to accept the site remediation plan.
24.

Kootenai County cited the Staffords with a violation of Kootenai County Ordinance

No. 374. The Staffords timely appealed the same to Kootenai County.
25.

The Staffords' appealed the referenced "Notice of Violation," dated August 29, 2007

and issued specifically under and limited by Ordinance No. 374 (was rejected) by the Kootenai
County Planning Depal1ment.
26.

The subsequent appeal was had from the Planning DepaI1ment' s decision to a Hearing

Officer appointed by Kootenai County (Lisa Keys). Following the hearing, Hearing Examiner Keys

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 5
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denied the appeal.
27.

A final appeal was made to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. The

Commissioners issued a final written decision, on March 19,2009, in the form attached hereto as
Exhibit A. The Staffords now appeal from the decision of Kootenai County (Exhibit A) denying
their appeal from an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 374.

IV. LEGAL BASES FOR APPEAL.
28.

Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. Ordinance No. 374

"superceded" the County's prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 283). The Kootenai
County Site Disturbance Ordinance before Ordinance No. 283 was Ordinance was No. 251. As of
December 12,2005, all prior Site Disturbance Ordinances had been specifically "superceded" by
Ordinance No. 374.
29.

The use of the word "supercede" is distinct from the use of the word "amend."

"Supercede" means that the prior Site Disturbance Ordinances that pre-date Ordinance No. 374 no
longer existed as of December 12,2005. Had the word "amend" been used, those Ordinances would
have remained in effect save and except for the specific modifications accomplished by Ordinance
No. 374.
30.

Without conceding the same, if there was a violation of Ordinance No. 251 or 283,

as occasioned by the Staffords prior to December 12,2005, then those violations would have been
conclusively "grandfathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No. 374. That is the legal effect
of the use of the use "supercede."
31.

Kootenai County, through the decision attached hereto and the matters set forth on

the record, held that the Staffords' argument regarding the specific use of the word "supercede" did

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 6

011

110t matter in that the conduct claim to be violative of Kootenai County's Site Disturbance Ordinance
would have been actionable under Ordinance Nos. 251 or 283. Not only were these Ordinances not
in effect at the time the Staffords were cited, the Staffords were not charged, and have not been
charged, with violations of the same. The only alleged violation at issue in the proceedings below,
and on appeal, is under Ordinance No. 374.
32.

By deciding as it did, Kootenai County has violated the substantive and procedural

rights of due process of Stafford, as secured by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In essence,
Kootenai County has held Stafford in violation of an Ordinance under which Stafford was never
charged and which is no longer in effect.
33.

Additionally, the violations noticed by Kootenai County do not constitute "significant

adverse effects" encompassed by Ordinance No. 374 even ifthe same is retroactively applicable to
the conditions under consideration.
34.

Additionally, the "natural vegetation buffer" of the Stafford property was disturbed

prior to adoption of the Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) and prior to the Staffords'
actions that form the basis for the alleged violation.
35.

Additionally, Ordinance No. 374 does not apply to the subject facts based upon the

clear language set forth in Sections 15 and 16 thereof.
36.

Additionally, the County has waived any right to claim a violation of Ordinance No.

374 based upon its explicit approvals of actions undertaken by and at the County's direction and with
the County's approval.
37.

Additionally, the County is estopped to claim any violation of Ordinance No. 374

based upon the facts of this case.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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38.

The charged violations asserted by Kootenai County are barred by all Statutes of

Limitation that apply to Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374, as well as its predecessor Ordinances
(Nos. 251 and 283).

V. PETITION FOR REVIEW
39.

Stafford incorporates herein as though set forth in full all allegations contained in

Paragraphs 1 through 38 above.
40.

Under the cited provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act,

I.e.

§67-6501, et.

seq., and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.e. §67-5201, et. seq. The Staffords have the
right to seek judicial review.
41.

The County's "Order of Decision" (Exhibit A hereto), finding Stafford in violation

of Kootenai Ordinance No.3 74, is contrary to law for each of the following non-exhaustive reasons:
(1)

The Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole;

(2)

The Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion;

(3)

The Board's decision was contrary to law; and

(4)

The Board's decision violated the due process protections

afforded

Stafford under the due process clauses of the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions.

Additionally, the Board's decision violates the Equal

Protection Clause in that Ordinance No. 374 has been disparately and
unequally enforced against the Staffords as contrasted with other
littoral property owners

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 8
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Lake Coeur d' Alene.

42.

The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to

dismiss the cited "Notice of Violation" for the reasons set forth herein.
43.

The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to

dismiss the same, or for other consistent proceedings, given the facts alleged herein.
44.

Kootenai County has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, sUbjecting itself

to an award ofthe Staffords' reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred under the authority of I.C.
§§12-117 and 12-121.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Stafford pray for relief as follows:
(l)

For entry of relief vacating Kootenai County's Order of Decision (Exhibit A), and

remanding this matter with instructions to dismiss the charged "Notice of Violation";
(2)

For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs as incUlTed herein and as provided

by Idaho Law, including but not limited to
(3)

I.e. §§12-117 and

12-121; and

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

Zf:; of March, 2009.

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitione s Staffordd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the fOret~document was served upon the
following by regular U.S. mail addressed as follows, this
ay of March, 2009:
John A. Cafferty, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
45 I Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD,
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. APP08-0002
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092)
FINDINGS OF FACT,
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF DECISION

J

BA CKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.0 I

The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("Appellants")
and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 0-1450-001oIS-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block t, Cd' A Lake Estates (Amended).

1.02

On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of
Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance #374 for a disturbance in the twenty-five foot (25 ')
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (hereinafter referred to as "the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit
S-1, Notice)

1.03

On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-County employees
Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by
Mrs. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be
forthcoming for this site.

1.04

On November 9, 2007, the County received a letter from the Stafford's remediation design
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007,
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit
A-12, Letter)

1.05

On November 21,2007, the Director received a letter from the Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson,
suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary. (Exhibit A-13a, Letter)

1.06

On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the
various permits, which did not include materials substantiating any allowance or approval for
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit S-16, Letter)

1.07

On January 23, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-18, Letter)

J .08

On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email)

0'16

EXHIBIT

A

Order of Decision
1.09

Appeal- Case No. APP08-0002

Page 2 of9

On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January IS,
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan.
No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter)

I. lOOn March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit 8-27, Notice)
I. I I

On March 21, 2008, Mr.Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-2B, Letter)

1.12

Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a
meeting was held on April 9,2008 with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, Director Scott Clark and Staff
to discuss the code violation. Based on staff's understanding that the Staffords had agreed to work
with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal process
has continued.

1.13

In a letter dated May 9,2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal.

J • 14

Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August 18,
2008. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing
scheduled for August 2 I, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was
pulled from the August 18 th afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52,
Letters)

1.15

A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing,
proceeding with rescheduling and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit 8-49, Letter)

1.16

Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3,2008.

I. I 7

On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. Roxy Webb
presented the County's position. She testified that the Appellants were cited for site disturbance
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature,
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated assessors photos, she stated
that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She
showed assessors photos dated July, 200 1, showing work be done in the 25 foot no disturbance zone,
in violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon
Ordinance 25 I). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site
disturbance zone ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a
no disturbance zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of 2125.0
feet above sea level for Lake Coeur d' Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a
natural vegetative state, with no logging, construction, utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface or
storm water facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified
that according to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms.
Blalack and Ms. Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the
two staff members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section R I 05.4 of
the International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting of a permit shall
not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of any violation of any provisions of this code or
any other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building official is also authorized to
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation of this code or ofany other ordinances of
this jurisdiction. .. (Exhibit HE-lOOO, International Residential Building Code)
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right through the
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6,
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He
testified- that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008,
after not hearing from the County "for months."
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in
their plan.
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of Ordinance 374, established the effective date as
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void,
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date
of the new ordinance were essentially "grandfathered."
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate.
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notifYing them
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled ifhe provided a
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19 th ). He understood this to mean that
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day.
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same
day (August 191h) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation.
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 200], he interviewed professional landscapers and
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green"
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 200, was labeled wrong, because the
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 2001. He also testified that
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was still in place. He stated
that they had not done any work since October of2001, and that while they have received a permit
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 200 I, though
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state.
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In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the assessors
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-t002). She also introduced into the record an area map,
giving an overview of the area (Exhibit HE-t003).
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity

has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction oj utility trenches,
roads. structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural
state . ..
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed.
1.18

An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also
requested to testiry as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners
Association. Although the Board provided each of them with the opportunity to demonstrate how
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-6521 or of "affected party" under Section 922-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testiry to the merits of the
appeal.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

2.01

The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27,1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan
submitted with the Application for permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GIA out of 25 foot
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of
Occupancy on March 23, 2000 and the $2,700.00 financial guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000.
(Exhibit 5-5, Permit)

2.02

Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance #251 required a 25' no
disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 5-6, Ordinance 251)

2.03

Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 5-7, Permit)

2.04

Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second building
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 8-8, Ordinance 374)
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2.05

During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation still existing
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit 8-3a, Photograph)

2.06

Site inspection photographs dated August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show un-permitted
waterfall, manicured lavin, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-4,
Photographs)

2.07

The July 11, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit S-3b, Photograph)

2.08

Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796
and #40613. (Exhibits 8-3c, d, e, f, Photographs)

2.09

The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance.

III

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

3.01

Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12,2005, codified at Title
11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January I, 1997
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999.
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283:

Section 4:
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer - An area where no development activity has occurred or
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures,
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state.
Section 8(B):
Waterfront Lots:For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers,
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or
length). or a tram shall be allowed io encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of
25 feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes of this
Ordinance. high water marks shall be considered to be the follOWing elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. V.D. 1929 datum)
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Building and Planning Department Fee Schedule per Resolution No. 2006-111; Appeal of
Administrative Detennination, Rescheduling Hearing
Reschedule Hearing
Public Notice

IV

Appeal - Case No. APP08-0002

$200.00
$ 40.00

HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report)

In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07-0092, a site
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation, as based upon the
following:
4.0 I

Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section RI05.4 of the
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit

shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this
code or any other ordinance ofthe jurisdiction. "
4.02

Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration,
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shall supersede" the
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12, 2005. On this basis, he argued that if
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially
"grandfathered. "
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr.
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 25 J null and void, thus
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit.

4.03

Mr. Magnuson claims that the- alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact andlor in law.
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not

limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances,
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which
this buffer distance shall be measured specifically for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer.
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling
fee.
4.04

Mr. Magnuson claims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 21, 2008 was effectively
rescheduled by County staff, after he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-111. Based upon
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted
the Building & Planning Department on August 18,2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeline (Exhibit HE-t002). As based upon the letter
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it
appears unwarranted to charge the appelJant[s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing.

V

HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDATION (from Hearing Examiner report)

5.01

In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the
Appellant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of
violation, the Appellant[ s'J request to estop the notice of violation CV07 -0092, and any enforcement
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED.

5.02

In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly
levied against the AppelJant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded.

VI

BOARD ANALYSIS

6.01

At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford,
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner.

6.02

The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance with Site
Disturbance Ordinance No. 374. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this nodisturbance zone was first established.
6.03

In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis
of this issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above.

6.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan.

6.05

Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore, be allowed to stay as shown on the plan.

6.06

After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on. this issue. The letter to the appellant is clear that
County staffwotild reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee.
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is
appropriate for the County to bear this cost.

Vll

CONCLUSIONS OF LA W

7.01

The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374,
codified at Title 11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code.

7.02

The A ppellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance
Ordinance.

7.03

the
The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.
Specifically, the un-permitted
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the
25 foot no disturbance zone.

7.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan.

7.05

Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for reschedul ing.

VIII

ORDER OF DECISION

Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on
the record of proceedings in this appeal, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS
thaI the issuance of the Notice of Violation in Case No. CV07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED.
The Board further ORDERS as follows:
8.0 I

The Appellants, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford, shall submit and receive approval for a Site
Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees.

8.02

The Board of County Commissioners hereby sets a compliance timeline of sixty (60) days from the
date of signing to bring the site into compliance with Kootenai County Ordinances.
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8.03

The rescheduling fee of $240.00 shall be refunded to the Appellants.

IX

NOTICE OF RIGHTS
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You have the right to request a regulatory takings analysis pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003. Any such
request must be submitted to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department within twenty-eight
(28) days from the date of mailing this decision.
You also have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of mailing to appeal this decision to the District Court.
Any such appeal must be taken in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code and Rule 84 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this J 9th day of March 2009

BY ORDER OFTHE KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Yea

Nay

r&I

0
Elmer R. Currie, ~rman

o

C: Prosecuting Attorney (Civil Division)
John F. Magnuson, Attorney at Law
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COllNiY OF rIOOr::NAIJ .JJ
FILED:

JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208)667-0100
Fax: (208) 667-0500
IS13 #4270
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE
STAFFORD, husband and wife,

CASE NO.: 09-2516

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

vs.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,
Defendants/Respondents.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Petitioners named above, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, by and
through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, by way of this "First Amended Petition for
Judicial Review" against the Defendants/Respondents named above, and aver and allege as set forth
herein. Petitioners appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act,

I.e.

§67-6501, et. seq.,

including but not limited to 1. C. §67-6521. Petitioners further appeal pursuant to the Idaho
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Administrative Procedure Act,

I.e. §67-5201, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C.

§67-5270.

This appeal is also made pursuant to LR.C.P. 84.

I. PARTIES.
1.

PlaintifTs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford are the owners of certain real

property located in unincorporated Kootenai County. Said property is identified as Kootenai County
Parcel No. 0-1450-001-015-A, Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates (amended).
Said property consists of littoral property on Lake Coeur d'Alene.

Plaintiffs/Petitioners are

collectively referred to herein as "Stafford."
2.

Defendant/Respondent Kootenai County is a political subdivision of the State of

Idaho acting by and through Defendants/Respondents Currie, Piazza, and Tondee (all members of
the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners). Defendant/Respondent is referred to herein as
"Kootenai County."

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.
3.

This First Amended Petition for review is filed pursuant to the Local Land Use

Planning Act, I.C. §67 -6501, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C. §67-6521, as well as the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201, including but not limited to I.C. §67-5270.
Jurisdiction and venue are proper pursuant to Idaho Law, including the foregoing authorities as well
as l.R.c.P. 84.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

In July of 1999, Stafford submitted a site plan in conjunction with site improvements

and the construction of a home on the Stafford property. The property had previously been disturbed
through third-party logging operations and development, including activities within twenty-five (25)
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feet of the ordinary high watermark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur d' Alene (elevation 2128 (WWP
datum)).
5.

The site disturbance permit was issued in conjunction with the site plan submitted

in July of 1999. Construction thereafter progressed. In March 2000, a Certificate of Occupancy was
issued to Stafford.
6.

At the time Stafford submitted the July 1999 site plan, and the County thereafter

issued the requisite site disturbance permit, the County's Site Disturbance Ordinance was
denominated Ordinance 251.
7.

In the spring of 2001, Stafford personally made inquiry of the Kootenai County

Planning Department regarding his ability to vegetate within the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone
from the OHWM. He was advised that "re-greening" was not a problem. He was further advised
that "re-greening" would not require any permit or approval from Kootenai County.
8.

At the time Stafford purchased the property, the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone

from the OHWM, as described above, included native sands and basalt rock. The same is true both
then and today with respect to adjacent property located below the OHWM of 2128.
9.

Following Stafford's contact with the Kootenai County Planning Department, in

2001, Stafford placed natural basalt rocks near the shore as a natural bulkhead. The rocks are
indigenous to the area.
10.

At the same time, Stafford also replaced some naturally occurring sand that had been

dissipated by boat wakes and prior 100 year flooding incidents in 1996 and 1997.
11.

At about the same time, Stafford also placed some grass outside and inside the

twenty-five (25) foot setback zone, and area that had previously been occupied by both native grasses
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and noxious weeds.
12.

Stafford made no effort to hide any of these "improvements," the same being

implicitly if not explicitly condoned or approved by Kootenai County.
13.

During the intervening five (5) years following installation of the improvements,

Kootenai County took numerous pictures of the Stafford property, pictures that it retained in its
actual possession. Kootenai County took no enforcement action of any kind or nature during this
five-year period.
14.

In 2005, the Staffords submitted a second site plan. At that time, Stafford intended

to construct an addition to the home first constructed under the July 1999 permit.
15.

The site plan depicted a barbecue pit, showing the same to traverse the actual twenty-

five (25) foot setback line. Kootenai County reviewed the plan, signed off on the plan, and approved
the same.
16.

In conjunction with the site improvements sought in 2005, Kootenai County

inspected the Stafford property. No objections were raised by Kootenai County as to any conditions
extant on the Stafford property.
17.

The Staffords undertook construction as authorized by the 2005 permit so as to add

an addition to their home. Throughout the construction process, numerous inspections were
undertaken by various agents of Kootenai County.

Those agents either viewed, or had the

opportunity to view, any improvements previously made by the Staffords within said twenty-five
(25) foot setback zone. No objections were raised.
18.

In August of 2007, the Staffords called for a final inspection in order to obtain their

Certificate of Occupancy.

The framing inspector advised them that they would not obtain a

FInST AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -I'AGE4

028

Certificate of Occupancy due to alleged site disturbance violations.
19.

The Staffords immediately initiated contact with Kootenai County. The Staffords

suggested that the parties resolve the issue before the impending holiday season of 2007. They
received no response from Kootenai County.
20.

The Staffords renewed their suggestion that the parties attempt to resolve the issue

prior to the holiday season of2007 so that they could get a Certificate of Occupancy. They received
no response from Kootenai County.
21.

In January of 2008, Kootenai County made contact with the Staffords, having

previously ignored their amicable efforts to meet and resolve the issue, and advised them that
Kootenai County would refuse to issue the Staffords a Certificate of Occupancy for their addition
based upon alleged violations (under the Site Disturbance Ordinance) that had absolutely nothing
to do with the addition to the home.
22.

In order to placate Kootenai County, the Staffords submitted a proposed site

remediation plan. The site remediation plan recommended leaving the basalt boulders and sand in
place as the removal of the same would cause a larger disturbance than simply leaving them as is.
Kootenai County refused to accept the site remediation plan.
23.

Kootenai County cited the Staffords with a violation of Kootenai County Ordinance

No. 374. The Staffords timely appealed the same to Kootenai Connty.
24.

The Staffords' appealed the referenced "Notice of Violation," dated August 29, 2007

and issued specifically under and limited by Ordinance No. 374 (was rejected) by the Kootenai
County Planning Department.
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25.

The subsequent appeal was had from the Planning Department's Decision to a

Hearing Officer appointed by Kootenai County (Lisa Keys).

Following the hearing, Hearing

Examiner Keys denied the appeal.
26.

A final appeal was made to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. The

Commissioners issued a final written Decision, on March 19,2009, in the form attached hereto as
Exhibit A. The Board's Decision of March 19,2009 was amended by an "Amended" Decision of
April 16,2009. A true and correct copy of the Amended Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
The Staffords now appeal fi'om the Decisions of Kootenai County (Exhibits A and B) denying their
appeal fi'om an alleged violation of Ordinance No.3 74.

IV. LEGAL BASES FOR APPEAL.
27.

Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. Ordinance No. 374

"superceded" the County's prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 283). The Kootenai
County Site Disturbance Ordinance before Ordinance No. 283 was Ordinance was No. 251. As of
December 12,2005, all prior Site Disturbance Ordinances had been specifically "superceded" by
Ordinance No. 374.
28.

The lise of the word "supercede" is distinct from the use of the word "amend."

"Supercede" means that the prior Site Disturbance Ordinances that pre-date Ordinance No. 374 no
longer existed as of December 12,2005. Had the word "amend" been used, those Ordinances would
have remained in effect save and except for the specific modifications accomplished by Ordinance
No. 374.
29.

Without conceding the same, if there was a violation of Ordinance No. 251 or 283,

as occasioned by the Staffords prior to December 12,2005, then those violations would have been
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conclusively "grand fathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No.3 74. That is the legal effect
of the use of the use "supercede."
30.

Kootenai County, through the Decision attached hereto and the matters set forth on

the record, held that the Staffords' argument regarding the specific use ofthe word "supercede" did
not matter in that the conduct claim to be violative of Kootenai County's Site Disturbance Ordinance
would have been actionable under Ordinance Nos. 251 or 283. Not only were these Ordinances not
in effect at the time the Staffords were cited, the Staffords were not charged, and have not been
charged, with violations of the same. The only alleged violation at issue in the proceedings below,
and on appeal, is under Ordinance No. 374.
31.

By deciding as it did, Kootenai County has violated the substantive and procedural

rights of due process of Stafford, as secured by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In essence,
Kootenai County has held Stafford in violation of an Ordinance under which Stafford was never
charged and which is no longer in effect.
32.

Additionally, the violations noticed by Kootenai County do not constitute "significant

adverse effects" encompassed by Ordinance No. 374 even ifthe same is retroactively applicable to
the conditions under consideration.
33.

Additionally, the "natural vegetation buffer" of the Stafford property was disturbed

prior to adoption of the Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) and prior to the Staffords'
actions that form the basis for the alleged violation.
34.

Additionally, Ordinance No. 374 does not apply to the subject facts based upon the

clear language set forth in Sections 15 and 16 thereof.
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35.

Additionally, the County has waived any right to claim a violation of Ordinance No.

374 based upon its explicit approvals of actions undeliaken by and at the County's direction and with
the County's approval.
36.

Additionally, the County is estopped to claim any violation of Ordinance No. 374

based upon the facts of this case.
37.

The charged violations asserted by Kootenai County are barred by all Statutes of

Limitation that apply to Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374, as well as its predecessor Ordinances
(Nos. 251 and 283).

V. PETITION FOR REVIEW
38.

Stafford incorporates herein as though set forth in full all allegations contained in

Paragraphs

j

39.

through 37 above.
Under the cited provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act,

seq., and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act,

I.e. §67-520 1, et. seq.

I.e.

§67-6501, et.

The Staffords have the

right to seek judicial review.
The County's "Order of Decision" (Exhibit A hereto), finding Stafford in violation

40.

of Kootenai Ordinance No. 374, is contrary to law for each ofthe following non-exhaustive reasons:

(l)

The Board's Decision was not supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole;

(2)

The Board's Decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion;

(3)

The Board's Decision was contrary to law; and
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(4)

The Board's Decision violated the due process protections afforded
Stafford under the due process clauses of the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions. Additionally, the Board's Decision violates the Equal
Protection Clause in that Ordinance No. 374 has been disparately and
unequally enforced against the Staffords as contrasted with other
littoral property owners on Lake Coeur d' Alene.

41.

The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to

dismiss the cited "Notice of Violation" for the reasons set forth herein.
42.

The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to

dismiss the same, or for other consistent proceedings, given the facts alleged herein.
43.

Kootenai County has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, subjecting itself

to an award of the Staffords' reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred under the authority of I.C.
§§/2-117 and 12-121.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Stafford pray for relief as follows:
(1)

For entry of relief vacating Kootenai County's Orders of Decision (Exhibits A and

B), ancl remanding this matter with instructions to dismiss the charged "Notice of Violation;"
(2)

For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs as incurred herein and as provided

by Idaho Law, including but not limited to I.C. §§12-117 and 12-121; ancl
(3)

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just ancl equitable.
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DA TED this.?__
1 day of April, 2009.

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 10

034

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
following by regular u.s. mail addressed as follows, this £ d a y of April, 2009:
John A. Cafferty, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD,
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE

)
)

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. APP08-0002
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092)
FINDINGS OF FACT,
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF DECISION

I

BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.01

The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("Appel/ants")
and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 0-1450-001015-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block I., Cd' A Lake Estates (Amended).

1.02

On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of
Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance #374 for a disturbance in the twenty-five foot (25')
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (hereinafter referred to as "the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit

S-I, Notice)
1.03

On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-County employees
Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by
Mrs. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be
forthcoming for this site.

1.04

On November 9, 2007, the County received a letter from the Stafford's remediation design
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007,
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit
A-l2, Letter)

1.05

On November 21, 2007, the Director received a letter from the Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson,
suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary. (Exhibit A-13a, Letter)

1.06

On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the
various permits, which did not include materials substantiating any allowance or approval for
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit S-16, Letter)

1.07

On January 23, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-IS, Letter)

1.08

On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email)
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1.09

On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January 15,
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan.
No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter)

1.10

On March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit S-27, Notice)

I. I I

On March 21, 2008, Mr. Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-28, Letter)

I.J 2

Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a
meeting was held on April 9, 2008 with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, Director Scott Clark and Staff
to discuss the code violation. Based on staff's understanding that the Staffords had agreed to work
with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal process
has continued.

I. 13

In a letter dated May 9,2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal.

I. 14

Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August 18,
2008. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing
scheduled for August 21, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was
pulled from the August lSIh afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52,
Letters)

I. I 5

A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing,
proceeding with reschedul ing and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit S-49, Letter)

1. I 6

Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3, 2008.

J.17

On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Exam iner. Roxy Webb
presented the County's position. She testified that the Appellants were cited for site disturbance
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature,
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated assessors photos, she stated
that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She
showed assessors photos dated July, 2001, showing work be done in the 25 foot no disturbance zone,
in violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon
Ordinance 251). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site
disturbance zone ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a
no disturbance zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of2125.0
feet above sea level for Lake Coeur d'Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a
natural vegetative state, with no logging, construction, util ity trenches, roads, structures, or surface or
storm water facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified
that according to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms.
Blalack and Ms. Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the
two staff members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section R 105.4 of
the International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting ofa permit shall
not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this code or
any other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building official is also authorized to
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation of this code or ofany other ordinances of
thisjurisdiction. .. (Exhibit HE-IOOO, International Residential Building Code)
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right rhrough the
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6,
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He
testified. that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008,
after not hearing from the County "for months,"
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in
their plan.
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of Ordinance 374, establis~ed the effective date as
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void,
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date
of the new ordinance were essentially "gran dfathered. "
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate.
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notitying them
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a
th
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19 ). He understood this to mean that
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day.
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same
day (August 19 th ) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation.
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 2001, he interviewed professional landscapers and
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green"
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 200, was labeled wrong, because the
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 200 f. He also testified that
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was still in place. He stated
that they had not done any work since October of 2001, and that while they have received a permit
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 200 I, though
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state.
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In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the assessors
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-I 002). She also introduced into the record an area map,
giving an overview ofthe area (Exhibit HE-I 003).
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity

has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction of utility trenches,
roads, structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural
state . ..
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed.
1.18

An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also
requested to testify as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners
Association. Although the Board provided each of them with the opportunity to demonstrate how
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-652] or of "affected party" under Section 922-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testi:f)rto the merits of the
appeal.

II

FINDINGS OF FA CT

2.01

The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27, 1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan
submitted with the Application for permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GlA out of 25 foot
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of
Occupancy on March 23, 2000 and the $2,700.00 financial guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000.
(Exhibit 5-5, Permit)

2.02

Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance #251 required a 25' no
disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exbibit 5-6, Ordinance 251)

2.03

Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 5-7, Permit)

2.04

Site Disturbance Ordinance No.3 74, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second bu ilding
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit S-8, Ordinance 374)
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2.05

During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation stil I existing
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit S-3a, Photograph)

2.06

Site inspection photographs dated August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show un-permitted
waterfall, manicured la',.'1n, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit S-4,
Photographs)

2.07

The July I J, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit S-3b, Photograph)

2.08

Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796
and #40613. (Exhibits S-3c, d, e, f, Photographs)

2.09

The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance.

III

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

3.01

Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12,2005, codified at Title
II, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January 1, 1997
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999.
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283:

Section 4:
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Bu(fer - An area where no development activity has occurred or
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures,
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state.
Section 8(B):
Waterfront Lots:For lots withfrontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers,
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained al the waterfront. A stairway or walkway
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within Ihe buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of
25 feel in slope dis/ance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes of this
Ordinance, high water marks shall be considered to be the following elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. V.D. 1929 datum)
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$200.00
$ 40.00

HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report)

In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07 -0092, a site
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation, as based upon the
following:
4.0 I

Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section R 105.4 of the
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit
shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this
code or any other ordinance ofthe jurisdiction. "

4.02

Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration,
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shaJI supersede" the
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12,2005. On this basis, he argued that if
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially
"grandfathered. "
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr.
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 251 nuIJ and void, thus
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit.

4.03

Mr. Magnuson claims that the alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact and/or in law.
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 3 74 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances,
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which
this buffer distance sha/l be measured specifica/ly for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer.
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling
fee.
4.04

Mr. Magnuson claims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 2 I, 2008 was effectively
rescheduled by County staff, aftei he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-1 J 1. Based upon
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted
the Building & Planning Department on August 18, 2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeJine (Exhibit HE-I002). As based upon the letter
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it
appears unwarranted to charge the appellant[s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing.

V

HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDA TION (from Hearing Examiner report)

5.01

In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the
Appellant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of
violation, the AppeJlant[s'] request to estop the notice of violation CV07-0092, and any enforcement
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED.

5.02

In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly
levied against the Appellant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded.

VI

BOARD ANALYSIS

6.0 I

At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford,
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner.

6.02

The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance witil Site
Disturbance Ordinance No.3 74. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this nodisturbance zone was first established.

6.03

In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis
of this issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above.

6.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeai may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a remediati on site disturbance plan.

6.05

Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore, be allowed to stay as shown on the plan.

6.06

After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on. this issue. The letter to the appellant is clear that
County stafr-would reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee.
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is
appropriate for the County to bear this cost.

VIJ

CONCLUSIONS OF LA W

7.01

The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374,
codified at Title II, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code.

7.02

The Appellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance
Ordinance.

7.03

The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with
the
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.
Specifically, the un-permitted
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the
25 foot no disturbance zone.

7.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan.

7.05

Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for rescheduling.

VIII

OIUJER OF DECISION

Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on
the record of proceedings in this appeaJ, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS
that the issuance ofthe Notice of Violation in Case No. CY07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED.
The Board further ORDERS as follows;
8.01

The Appellants, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford, shall submit and receIve approval for a Site
Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees.

8.02

The Board of County Commissioners hereby sets a compliance timeline of sixty (60) days from the
date of signing to bring the site into compliance with Kootenai County Ordinances.
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The rescheduling fee of$240.00 shall be refunded to the Appellants.
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You have the right to request a regulatory takings analysis pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003. Any such
request must be submitted to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department within twenty-eight
(28) days from the date of mailing this decision.
',~

"

You also have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of mailing to appeal this decision to the District Court.
Any such appeal must be taken in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code and Rule 84 of the
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 19th day of March 2009

BY ORDER OF THE KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Yea

Nay

o
Elmer R. Currie,

o

,4

~
n

o

-

C: Prosecuting Attorney (Civil Division)
John F. Magnuson, Attorney at Law
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD,
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. APP08-0002
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092)

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT,
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS~
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF DECISION

I

BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.0 I

The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("the
Staffords") and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 01450-001-01S-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block 1, Cd'A Lake Estates (Amended).

1.02

On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department ("the Department")
issued a Notice of Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374 for a disturbance in the twentyfive foot (25') undisturbed natural vegetation buffer ("the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit 8-1,
Notice)

1.03

On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-Department employees

Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by
Ms. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be
forthcoming for this site.
1.04

On November 9, 2007, the Department received a letter from the Staffords' remediation design
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007,
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit
A-I2, Letter)

1.05

On November 21,2007, Department Director Scott Clark ("the Director") received a letter from the
Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson, suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary.
(Exhibit A-13a, Letter)

1.06

On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the
various permits, which did not include m~terials substantiating any allowance or approval for
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit 8-16, Letter)

1.07

On January 23,2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-18, Letter)

1.08

On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email)

EXHIBIT
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1.09

On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January 15,
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan.
No
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter)

1.10

On March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit S-27, Notice)

1.11

On March 21, 200S, Mr. Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with-respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-28, Letter)

1.12

Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a
meeting was held on April 9, 200S with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, the Director and Department
staff to discuss the code violation. Based on staffs understanding that the Staffords had agreed to
work with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal
process has continued.

1.13

In a letter dated May 9, 2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal.

1.14

Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August IS,
200S. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing
scheduled for August 21, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was
pulled from the August 18 th afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52,
Letters)

1.15

A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing,
proceeding with rescheduling and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit S-49, Letter)

1.16

Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3, 200S.

1.17

On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. Roxy Webb
presented the County's position. She testified that the Staffords were cited for site disturbance
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature,
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated Assessor's photos, she
stated that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She
showed Assessor's photos dated July, 200], showing work be done in the no-disturbance zone, in
violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon Ordinance
251). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site disturbance zone
ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a no disturbance
zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of 2125.0 feet above sea
level for Lake Coeur d' Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a natural vegetative
state, with no logging, construction, utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface or storm water
facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified that according
to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms. Blalack and Ms.
Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the two staff
members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section RI05.4 of the
International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting ofa permit shall not
be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of any violation of any provisions of this code or any
other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building offiCial is also authorized to
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation o/this code or of any other ordinances of
this jurisdiction. " (Exhibit HE-lOOO, International Residential Building Code)
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right through the
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6,
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He
testified that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008,
after not hearing from the County "for months."
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in
their plan.
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of-Ordinance 374, established the effective date as
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void,
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date
of the new ordinance were essentially "grandfathered."
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate.
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notifYing them
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19 th ). He understood this to mean that
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day.
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same
day (August 19th) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation.
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 200], he interviewed professional landscapers and
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green"
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 2001, was labeled wrong, because the
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 200 I. He also testified that
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was stiIl in place. He stated
that they had not done any work since October of2001, and that while they have received a permit
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 2001, though
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state.
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In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the Assessor's
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-t002). She also introduced into the record an area map,
giving an overview of the area (Exhibit HE-t003).
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity
has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction of utility trenches,
roads, structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural
state. "
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed.
1.18

An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12,
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also
requested to testiry as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners
Association. Although the Board provided each 9f them with the opportunity to demonstrate how
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-6521 or of "affected party" under Section 922-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testiry to the merits of the
appeal.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

2.01

The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27, 1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan
submitted with the Application for Permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GIA ouf oj 25 JOOf
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of
Occupancy on March 23,2000 and the $2,700.00 financiai guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000.
(Exhibit 8-5, Permit)

2.02

Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 25 I, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance No. 251 required a 25'
no disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 8-6, Ordinance 251)

2.03

Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-7, Permit)

2.04

Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second building
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit S-8, Ordinance 374)
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2.05

During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation still existing
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit 8-3a, Photograph)

2.06

Site inspection photographs . dated August 28, 2007 and A~gust 29, 2007 show un-permitted
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-4,
Photographs)

2.07

The July 11, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit 8-3b, Photograph)

2.08

Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796
and #40613. (Exhibits S-3c, d, e, f, Photographs)

2.09

The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance.

III

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

3.0 I

Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12, 2005, codified at Title
11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January I, 1997
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283:

Section 4:
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Bu([er - An area where no development activity has occurred or
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures,
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state.
Section 8(B):
Waterfront Lots:For lots with/rontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers,
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of
25 feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes 0/ this
Ordinance. high water marks shall be considered to be the following elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. v.D. 1929 datum)
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Building and Planning Department Fee Schedule per Resolution No. 2006-111; Appeal of
Administrative Determination, Rescheduling Hearing
Reschedule Hearing
Public Notice

IV
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$200.00
$ 40.00

HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report)

In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07-0092, a site
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation,as based upon the
following:
4.01

Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section RI05.4 of the
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit
s hall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this
code or any other ordinance ofthe jurisdiction. "

4.02

Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration,
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shall supersede" the
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12,2005. On this basis, he argued that if
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially
"grandfathered. "
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr.
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 251 null and void, thus
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit.

4.03

Mr. Magnuson claims that the alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact andlor in law.
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and stormwater
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances,
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which
this buffer distance shall be measured specifically for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer.
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling
fee.
4.04

Mr. Magnuson c.iaims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 21, 2008 was effectively
rescheduled by County staff, after he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-111. Based upon
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted
the Building & Planning Department on August 18, 2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeline(Exhibit HE-l002). As based upon the letter
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it
appears unwarranted to charge the appellant[ s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing.

V

HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDATION (from Hearing Examiner report)

5.01

In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the
AppelJant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of
violation, the Appellant[s'] request to estop the notice of violation CV07-0092, and any enforcement
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED.

5.02

In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly
levied against the Appellant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded.

VI

BOARD ANALYSIS

6.01

At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford,
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner.

6.02

The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance with Site
Disturbance Ordinance No. 374. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this nodisturbance zone was first established.
6.03

In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis
ofthis issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above.

6.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a site disturbance remediation plan.

6.05

Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore be allowed to stay as shown on the plan.

6.06

After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on this issue. The letter to the appellant-is clear that
County staff would reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee.
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is
appropriate for the County to bear this cost.

VII

CONCLUSIONS OF LA W

7.01

The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374,
codified at Title 11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code.

7.02

The Appellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance
Ordinance.

7.03

The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with
the
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.
Specifically, the un-permitted
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the
25 foot no disturbance zone.

7.04

The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and
completion of a site disturbance remediation plan.

7.05

Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for rescheduling.

VIII

ORDER OF DECISION

Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on
the record of proceedings in this appeal, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS
that the issuance of the Notice ofYiolation in Case No. CY07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED.
The Board further ORDERS as follows:
8.01

The Appellants, Dr. Douglas Stafford and Ms. Michelle Stafford, shall submit and receive approval
for a Site Disturbance Remediation Plan and pay all associated fees. The proposed Site Disturbance
Remediation Plan shall be submitted, and all associated fees shall be paid, within sixty (60) days
from the date of signing of this Amended Order.

('\ 5 I)L.
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Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy, ISB #6020
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners,
Case No.
vs.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE. COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,

CV-09-2S16

NOTICE OF LODGING OF
TRANSCRIPT AND AGENCY
RECORD

Defendants/Respondents.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84, that a certified copy of
the Agency Record (Volumes 1 through 7) in the above-captioned matter is available for
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pick up at the Office of the Board of County Commissioners of Kootenai County, 451 N.
Government Way, Third Floor, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to LR.C.P. 84, that a certified copy of
the Transcript (Volume 1 of 1) of the hearings before the Board of County
Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, held on October 2, 2008, February 12,
2009, March 19,2009, and April 16, 2009, in the above-captioned matter pertaining to
Case No. APP08-0002, is available for pickup at the Office of the Board of County
Commissioners of Kootenai County, 451 N. Government Way, Third Floor, Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho 83816.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to LR.C.P. 84, that the total cost for
the Agency Record and Transcript is $867.95, as documented by the actual cost
statement attached hereto as Exhibit "An and made a part hereof by reference. The
sum of $853.30 was paid by the Petitioner, leaving a balance due of $14.45.
Respondent requests that Petitioners make payment to the Kootenai County Building &
Planning Department.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), that you have
fourteen (14) days from the date of mailing of this notice in which to file with the Board
of County Commissioners of Kootenai County any objections to the Transcript or to the
Agency Record. The Transcript shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is made
within fourteen (14) days after the date of service of this notice. The Agency Record
shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is made within fourteen (14) days after
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the date of service of this notice.
DATED this

'LrtJ

day of July, 2009.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~,) day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile (FAX) to the following persons:
John F. Magnuson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, JD 83814
Fax: (208) 667-0500

Patrick M. Braden
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KOOT NAI COUNTY
BUILDING & PLANNING
DEPARTMENT

Memo
To:

John F. Magnuson

r rnA'" .1 _
0l.NVl~ 6i/~

From: Sandi Gilbertson, Administrative Supervisor
Re:

Actual Cost - Preparation of Record and Transcript
District Court Case No. 09-2516
Building and Planning Case Nos. APP08-0002 and CV-07-0092

Date:

July 2, 2009

The following is the actual cost for preparation of the transcript and record pertaining to Case No. APPOS-0002
and CV-07-0092.
Case No. APPOS-0002 was heard on the following dates:
10/02/0S
02/12/09
03/19/09
04/16/09

Hearing Examiner Appeal Hearing
BOCC Appeal Hearing
BOCC Signing
BOCC Signing of Amended Order

Actual length of transcript = 110 pages @ $4.50 per page
Two additional copies @ $0.05/page
TRANSCRIPT TOTAL (3 SETS)

$ 495.00
$ 11.00
$ 506.00

Actual for copies of Case Files
1293 black & white pages @ $0.05/page
120 color pages @ $0.25/page

$ 64.65
$ 30.00
$ 94.65 x 3 sets

$ 283.95

Maps (24" x 36") North Idaho Blueprint

$ IS.00

Stafftime/mileage to North Idaho Blueprint for large maps
Time spent on estimate 1.0 hours @ $25.00/hour

$ 35.00
$ 25.00

ACTUAL COST TOTAL RECORD & PREPARATION COSTS (3 SETS)=
ESTIMATED TOTAL RECORD & PREPARA TION COSTS =
AMOUNT DUE

C:

$ 867.95
$ 853 .50
$ 14.45

Pat Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

9HIBIJ"
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Phone (208) 446-1070 • Fax (208) 446-1071
451 Government Way • P.O. Box 9000 • Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-9000
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Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy, ISB #6020
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-9000
Telephone : (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621

2009 JUL '1 PH 3: 09

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD,
husband and wife,
PIa intiffs/Petitioners,
Case No.
vs.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,

CV-09-2S16

NOTICE OF SETILEMENT AND
FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND
AGENCY RECORD

Defendants/Respondents.

Kootenai County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting through the
Kootenai Board of Commissioners, and Elmer R. "Rick" Currie, Rich Piazza, and Todd
Tondee, Commissioners, in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to as
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"Respondents"), by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney, hereby provide notice of the following:
1.

The Agency Record (Volumes 1 through 7) and Transcript (Volume 1 of 1)

in the above-captioned matter, of the hearings before the Board of County
Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, held on October 2,2008, February 12,
2009, March 19,2009, and April 16, 2009, in the above-captioned matter, pertaining to
Case No. APP08-0002, were compiled and lodged with the Board of County
Commissioners on July 2,2009.
2.

A Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Agency Record was filed with the

District Court on July 2,2009, and was served via facsimile on counsel for the
Petitioners on that date.
3.

Pursuant to I.RC.P. 84(j), the parties to this action had fourteen (14) days

. from the date of service of the Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Agency Record to
object to the Agency Record and/or Transcript. No objections were received by the
Board of County Commissioners within the aforementioned time period. Therefore,
pursuant to I.RC.P. 840), the Agency Record and Transcript are deemed settled.
4.

The settled Agency Record and Transcript in the above-captioned matter

were filed with the District Court on July 17, 2009, in compliance with I.RC.P. 84(k).
5.

Pursuant to I.RC.P. 84(p) and I.A.R 34(c), except as may be modified by

stipulation of the parties or subsequent order of the District Court, the briefing schedule
in the above-captioned matter shall be as follows:
a.

Petitioner's opening brief shall be filed no later than August 21,2009
(35 days from filing of this notice).
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b.

Respondent's brief shall be filed no later than twenty-eight (28) days after
the date of service of Petitioner's opening brief.

c.

Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed no later than twenty-one (21)
days after the date of service of Respondent's brief.

6.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(q), the Court is hereby requested to set the above-

captioned matter for oral argument.
DATED this 17th day of July, 2009.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecutor
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile (FAX) to the following persons:
John F. Magnuson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814
Fax: (208) 667-0500

Hon. John T. Mitchell
Delivery to Chambers

Patrick M. Braden
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
Fax: (208) 667-0500
ISB #4270
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Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE
STAFFORD, husband and wife,

CASE NO.: 09-2516

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

PLAINTIFFS' !PETITIONERS'
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL

vs.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,
Defendants/Respondents.

COME NOW Plaintiffs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford (hereafter "Stafford"), by
and through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Opening Brief
in support of their appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act,

I.e. §§ 67-6521 and the

Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. §§ 67-5270 through 67-5277. The Staffords seek review,
from this Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, of that certain "Amended Findings of Fact,
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BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE I

061

,..1'\

:1~;UTrl·J~/(.).)
I

Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Decision" entered by the Kootenai
County Commissioners on April 16,2009 in Case No. APP08-00002 (also denominated Case No.
CV -07-0092). Said Decision, appended to the "First Amended Petition for Review" at Exhibit B,
is referred to herein as "the Board's Order." This Opening Briefis supported by the Agency Record,
which is refened to herein by the acronym "AR." This Opening Brief is further supported by the
Transcript of Record, which is referred to herein by the acronym "Tr."

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case represents an appeal under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and the Local
Land Use Planning Act from a final Order of Kootenai County Board of Commissioners finding that
Douglas and Michelle Stafford violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374 (Kootenai County's
Site Disturbance Ordinance). The Staffords claim, and in fact have proven, that the actions that
allege to constitute violations of Ordinance No.3 74 were undertaken and known to the County prior
to the effective date of said Ordinance. The Staffords contend that they have been improperly and
retroactively cited under an Ordinance with an effective date that post-dates the actions complained
of. The Board disagreed and this appeal followed.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On September 7,2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department caused to
be issued to Stafford, under the heading "Case No. CV -07-0092," a "Notice of Violation." See AR,
Vol. I, p. 005. The Notice of Violation alleged that Stafford had violated Kootenai County's Site
Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) by causing "site disturbance within twenty-five foot setback." Id.
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING
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On March 19,2008, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (hereafter "the
Department") provided Stafford with a "Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation." See AR,
Vol. I, p. 0136. That Notice again alleged that Stafford was in violation of Kootenai County's Site
Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No.3 74). Id. The Department advised Stafford that he had fortyfive (45) days within which to file an administrative appeal from the Department's determination
that Stafford had violated Ordinance No. 374.
On March 21,2008, Stafford timely appealed the Department's administrative determination
that Stafford had violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0138. Stafford's
appeal came on before a Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. See AR, Vol. II, p. 0317. the Hearing
Examiner rejected Stafford's appeal, finding that Stafford had violated Kootenai County Ordinance
No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0468-0474.
Stafford appealed the Hearing Examiner's Decision to the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners (hereafter "the Board"). Id. at pp. 0475-0476. On March 19, 2009, the Board
entered its Order of Decision, rejecting Stafford's appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance
No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0615-0624. That Decision was amended on April 16,2009. See AR,
Vol. III, pp. 0628-0636. This appeal followed.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Ordinance No. 251.

Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251" is contained in the record at AR,
Vol. I, p. 0046-0066. Ordinance No. 251 took effect on January 1, 1997. Id. at p. 0062. Ordinance
No. 251 provided that, with respect to lots with frontage on Lake Coeur d'Alene, that "an
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. . .. The buffer shall be a
PLAINTIFFS'IPETITIONERS' OPENING
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minimum of twenty-five feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body [elevation
2125.0 (N.G.V.D. 1929 Datum)]." Id. at pp. 0057-58. 1
Ordinance No. 251 defines a "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" as:
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur,
including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches,
roads, structures, or surface and storm water facilities. Buffer areas
shall be left in their natural state.
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0049.
The purpose of Ordinance No. 251, as stated therein, is:
The purpose of this ordinance shall be to protect property, surface
water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from
excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earth works, soil erosion,
sedimentation, and storm water run-off and to provide maximum
safety in the development and design of building sites, roads, and
other surface amenities.
Id. at p. 0046. 2
2.

Ordinance No. 283.

Kootenai County "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283" became effective July 26, 1999. 3
The stated "purpose" of Ordinance No. 283 did not differ from that stated in Ordinance No.

lCoeur d'Alene Lake elevation 2125.0 at N.G.V.D. datum equates to elevation 2128
using Washington Water Power (now Avista) datum. Elevation 2128 is the level artificially
maintained during the summer months by the Avista dams on the Spokane River, the natural
outlet to Lake Coeur d'Alene.

20rdinance No. 251 provides, at Section 13, that violations may be considered a criminal
misdemeanor and punishable by a maximum fine of$300 or six (6) months injail, or both. See
AR, Vol. I, p. 0061.
3 A copy of Ordinance No. 283 was not included in the Administrative Record but is
provided herewith both to the Court and counsel as a courtesy.
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251. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer," as contained in Ordinance No. 283,
did not differ from that contained in Ordinance No. 251. The prohibition against development
activity within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back from elevation 2128 was also unchanged from that
contained in Ordinance No. 251.
3.

Ordinance No. 374.

Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374" was adopted effective December
12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. The stated "purpose" of the Ordinance did not change from the
purpose declared in Ordinance Nos. 251 and 283. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation
buffer" also went unchanged. Id. at p. 0081. So too did the prohibition against development activity
within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone from elevation 2128. Id. at p. 0089.
Ordinance No.3 74 contained the following specific language:
The provisions of this Ordinance [374] shall supersede the provisions
of Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283.
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093 (emphasis added). Ordinance No. 374 also specifically stated that it "shall
take effect and be in full force" on December 12,2005. Id.
4.

The Stafford Property.

The Stafford property consists of a three-quarter acre lot on Lake Coeur d'Alene. See AR,
Vol. I, p. 0028. The Staffords purchased the property in 1999. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057.
Dr. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony, before the Board, that development activity had
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone on the property prior to 1999.
[W]hen we bought the property in 1999 - that area - the development
that we're on was logged. Urn, the area down by the Lake actually
was used as a slash pile. When we bought the property, there was a
slash pile that they - it appears that they attempted to bury it - dug
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING
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about a three foot hole and they stuck and filled it up with about eight
or nine foot slash - slash pile of stumps of logs and things. Urn, the
property was torn up. It uh - noxious weeds on there. Canadian thistle
and knapweed.
See Tr., Vol. I, p. 20. Stafford also offered unrebutted testimony before the Board that his propeliy
had sand within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone at the time he purchased it. See Tr., Vol. I,
p.0058.
5.

The Staffords' First Building Permit Application.

The Staffords submitted an application for a building permit on the property in July of 1999.
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0028. Stafford sought to build a single family residence. Id.
issued in July of 1999 and construction began. Id.

The permit was

Construction of the Stafford home was

completed in 2000. The Department signed off on the Staffords' initial "Certificate of Occupancy"
on March 23, 2000. Id. at pp. 0039-0040.
6.

Subsequent Work Within the Twenty-Five Foot Set-Back Area.

In the summer of 2000, as confirmed by photographs offered by the Department, the
Staffords had accomplished minimal clean-up efforts of the prior development activity that had
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0010. In 2001, Dr.
Stafford desired to clean-up the prior development activity that had occurred within the twenty-five
(25) foot set-back zone on his property. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057.
Prior to undertaking any action, Dr. Stafford went to the Department for advice:
[W)e finished our house in 2000 and moved in. In the summer of ..
. 2001, we decided that we would like to do something that would
clean that up. It was a - it was a mess. At that time, we did hire a
landscaper. Uh, talked to him - came up with some plans. I personally
went down to Planning and Zoning and talked to the lady behind the
counter. I don't know her name, but it was in 2001. And specifically
PLAINTlFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING
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asked her, and told her our situation, it had been torn up uh was there
a problem with us planting grass and trees. And she told us that regreening was never a problem. And okay, so if I plant grass and
plants and trees down there, its not a problem. She repeated regreening is not a problem. So we went ahead ....
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0057-0058. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony that the improvements were
completed in 2001 :
I have since cleaned up the beach a little bit and moved some rocks
around and things like that, but urn, so in 2001, our project was
completed down there and as the photographs and records show we
were not trying to hide anything - it was there.
Id. at p. 0058. Photographs offered by the Department show that by July of 2002, the Stafford
property had been cleaned up, including areas within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See
AR, Vol. I, p. 0013. This included the addition of sand to the sand that previously existed (according
to Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), "re-greening" as approved by the DepaIiment (through the
unrebutted testimony of Dr. Stafford), and a portion of a barbeque pit that will be discussed more
fully below. Illustrative photographs are included in the Agency Record at Vol. I, pp. 0011-0025.
At the time the improvements were completed (July of200 1), the operative Site Disturbance
Ordinance in effect was Ordinance No. 283.
7.

The Staffords Apply for a Second Building Permit for an Addition to Their
Home.

In August of2005, the Staffords applied for a new building permit to authorize construction
of an addition to their home. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0067. The permit was approved by Kootenai County
in October of2005. Id.
As part of the submittals to Kootenai County, in support of their request for a building permit
for the addition, the Staffords submitted a "Site Plan" prepared by a professional engineer. See AR,
PLAINTIFFS'IPETITIONERS' OPENING
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Vol. II, p. 0269. This plan is referred to herein as "the Site Plan." The Site Plan depicts the twentyfive (2S) foot set-back "from vegetation line" (summer elevation of2128 WWP (Avista datum)).
Id. That set-back line is shown to run through the center of the barbeque pit that Dr. Stafford
installed in the summer of2001. Id. The Site Plan (as it will be referred to herein) was signed and
approved by the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department on October 13, 200S. Id.
Representatives of the County came out to inspect the Stafford construction project, which,
pursuant to the Site Disturbance permit issued by the County, included silt fences at or near the
shoreline. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 00S9. These individuals raised no objection or comment to the
improvements that Dr. Stafford had made some four or five years earlier. Id.
Effective December 12, 200S, Kootenai County Ordinance No.3 74 was adopted, specifically
superseding Ordinance No. 283 (which was in effect when the Staffords completed their
improvements within the twenty-five (2S) foot set-back zone in July of2001).
8.

The Staffords are Cited for Violating Ordinance No. 374.

The Staffords made request for a Certificate of Occupancy on the addition to their home that
was authorized by the 200S building permit. This request came in August of 2007. As part of that
final inspection, the Department issued a "Notice of Violation" (the Notice of Violation at issue in
this proceeding), claiming that the Staffords had violated Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374
(effective December 12, 200S) based upon the improvements that the Department acknowledges
were completed in July of 2001 (when Ordinance No. 283 was in effect and had not yet been
superseded). See AR, Vol. I, p. OOOS.
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9.

The Department Refuses to Issue a Certificate of Occupancy Based Upon the
Claim that the Staffords Had Violated Ordinance No. 374.

On November 21,2007, the Staffords, through counsel, wrote the Department's Director. See
AR, Vol. I, pp. 0106-0108. The Staffords attempted to resolve the matter, given the pending
holidays, and the County's position that they could not occupy their completed addition to their
home based upon alleged site disturbance violations occurring six (6) years earlier (and prior to the
adoption and effective date of the Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) relied upon by the County. The
County did not respond.
On December 5, 2007, the Staffords renewed their request to resolve the matter. See AR,
Vol. I, p. 0105. The County did not respond.
On January 15, 2008, after the holidays had passed, and some two (2) months later, the
County responded, refusing to consider the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy. See AR, Vol.
I, pp. 0113-0114.
After subsequent efforts to resolve the matter failed, the Department gave the Staffords notice
that the Department would be recording the "Notice of Violation," alleging a violation under
Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0127-0130. The Staffords then filed their appeal which
gives rise to this proceeding. Id. at p. 0138.
10.

Proceedings Before the Board of County Commissioners.

The Staffords argued to the Board that they had been improperly cited under Ordinance No.
374. Ordinance No.3 74, effecti ve Decem bel' 12, 2005, specifically "superseded" Ordinance no. 283.
Ordinance No. 283 was in effect in the summer of 2001 when the subject improvements were
completed. Ordinance No. 374 could not form the basis for a violation based upon action that
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preceded the effective date of the Ordinance.
The Board rejected the Staffords argument. 4 The Staffords argued at hearing to the Board in
part as follows:
It is important to note that the process that we are involved in ... the
charge against the Staffords is a violation of Ordinance 374. That is
what they have been charged with. Now, if somebody makes a claim
about a violation of 283 or 251, that's not the violation alleged here
today and then there will be an argument in that context as well, but
this is 374 only.

See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0087.
The Board noted that Ordinance No. 283 was in effect at the time the subject improvements
were completed. Commissioner Tondee stated:
The new ordinance going forward would be 3 74. That does not negate
that the time period that ordinance was in effect prior or the previous
ordinance 283 was in effect prior to that ... [TJhe work was done
there was an ordinance in effect that did not allow the work that was
done in 200 I. Vh, and the work that was done in 200 I was done
without a permit .... We're saying the work was done without a
permit and it's in violation of our ordinances to do work in that area
so from my understanding ... there needs to be a remediation plan
and it needs to put it back.
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0091-0092.
Commissioner Piazza agreed.

"I do believe that 283 was in effect at the time [the

improvements were completed)." See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0095.

4The Board did find that the Staffords would not be required to move the barbeque pit
that was specifically depicted on the Site Plan approved by the Department as part of the remodel
application. See AR, Vol. II, p. 0269. See also, Tr., Vol. I, p. 0083.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
A.

Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was
erroneous as a matter of law?

B.

Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was
arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion or unsupported by
substantial evidence?

e.

Whether the County is estopped to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 3747

III. ARGUMENT.
A.

Applicable Standards on Appeal.

The Staffords bring this appeal from the Board's Order of Decision pursuant to the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act, I.e. § 67-5201, et seq. Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279, the Board's Order
of Decision is subject to reversal if this COUl1 finds that the Board's "findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions" are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

In violation of Constitutional provisions;
Made upon unlawful procedure;
Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

See I.e. § 67-5279(3)(a), (c), (d), and (e).
The role of this Court, in its appellate capacity, in reviewing the Agency record for
compliance with § 67-5279, has previously been set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court
is to independently review the record for compliance with the standards set forth in the
Administrative Procedures Act. Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Assn., 141 Idaho 517, 521,
112 P.3d 805 (2005).

The Court's role is to review the matter to ensure compliance with the
applicable standards .... If these standards are not met, the agency
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING
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action " ... shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary" in accordance with the Court's
discretion ....
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Assn., 141 Idaho at 521 (citations omitted).
B.

The Board's Decision Sustaining the Violation Alleged Under Ordinance No.
374 Is Erroneous as a Matter of Law.
1.

The Adoption of Ordinance No. 374 Post-Dated the Conduct
Alleged to Constitute the Violation.

Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093.
There is no dispute that the actions giving rise to the violation were performed in the summer of
2001. Dr. Stafford has so testified. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. The Department's photographs confirm
the same. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Since the charging Ordinance (No. 374) was effective
prospectively from December 12, 2005, and since the complaint of conduct is conceded by the
County to have occurred in July of200 1, the charge under the ordinance relied upon by the County
cannot stand. The Board's Decision to the contrary was in error as a matter oflaw.
2.

Ordinance No. 283 is Irrelevant to this Proceeding.

The Commissioners, in deliberations reflected by the transcript, seemingly determined that
there was "no harm - no foul" since Ordinance No. 283, in effect between July 26, 1999 and
December 11,2005 (which encompasses the period when the encroachments were placed in service)
has similar language to Ordinance No. 374. This too was in error as a matter oflaw.
First, the Staffords were not charged under Ordinance No. 283. The charging document,
which carries criminal penalties, was based solely upon Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0005.
Second, although not essential to the granting of the relief requested on appeal by the
Staffords, Ordinance No. 283 no longer exists. Ordinance No. 374 specifically provided that it
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING
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"superseded" Ordinance No. 283. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. "Supersede" in this context, is distinct
from "amend." It is noteworthy that the word "amend" was not used.
"Supersede" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
"Obliterate, set aside, annul, replace, make void, inefficacious or
useless, repealed."
"Annul," one of the alternative definitions for "supersede," is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as:

"To make void or of no effect."
"Amend" to the contrary, is defined as "to change, correct, revise, improve." The difference
between "supersede" and "amend," in the legal sense, is that "supersede" undoes all that went before
it and starts anew. "Amend," on the other hand, keeps what was done before but simply changes it.
The use of the term "supersede" in Section 15 of Ordinance No. 374 "obliterated,"
"annulled," and "rendered of no force and effect" the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance
No. 283). Ordinance No. 374, the very Ordinance upon which the subject violation is based, is
effective only from December 12, 2005 forward. In other words, and without conceding the same,
ifthere was an arguable violation of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance, and if that violation was
not pursued administratively to a conclusion prior to December 12,2005, the violation is essentially
"grandfathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No.3 74. 5

5The resolution of this issue is not essential to finding in the Staffords favor. It is enough
for this Court to determine that the Staffords were charged under the incorrect Ordinance. It is
noteworthy, however, that since the Staffords were charged with a criminal violation under
Ordinance No. 374, and since that violation has proceeded to a final determination, the Staffords
might well be subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the U.S. Constitution in the event the
County hereafter attempts to cite them in subsequent proceedings under Ordinance No. 283
(notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 283 has been "superseded," "annulled," and "made
void or of no effect").
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3.

The Board's Determination is Contrary to the Language of
Ordinance No. 374 as Applied to These Facts.

The stated purpose of Ordinance No. 374 is "to protect property, surface water, and ground
water against significant adverse effects from excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil
erosion, sedimentation, and storm water run-off ... " See AR, Vol. I, p. 0078. There is no showing
on these facts that the placement of a barbeque pit (specifically authorized and condoned by the
Department), the replacement of previously-existing sand (an undisputed proposition based upon the
facts of record), the placement of basalt rocks indigenous to the very property (another point not
disputed by the record), and the placement of lawn upward from the Lake (but within the twenty-five
(25) foot set-back) with the County's oral permission and knowledge, creates any "significant
adverse effects."
Moreover, the County claims that Ordinance No. 374 was to promote an "undisturbed natural
vegetation buffer." Yet an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" is defined as "an area where no
development activity has occuned or will occur, including, but not limited to, logging .... " See
AR, Vol. I, p. 0081.
There is no dispute, based upon Dr. Stafford's testimony, which was unrebutted, that the
subject property, prior to the Staffords' purchase of the same in 1999, was logged, developed, and
used, all within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone, for what is defined by the Ordinance as
"development activity." If the purpose of leaving an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer is to
preclude development activity, then that purpose is irrelevant when development activity has already
occurred. Does the County really suggest that the Staffords are to leave an undisturbed slash pile and
noxious weeds on the property? There wasn't an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" in place
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when Ordinance No. 374 (or Ordinance No. 283 for that matter) became effective based on the facts
of this case. Hence, there was no "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" to maintain.
C.

The Board's Determination Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and Constituted an
Abuse of Discretion.

The Board's Decision, based upon the factors and authorities set forth above, would primarily
consist of the specific language of Ordinance No. 374 and well-accepted principles of statutory
construction, suggests that the Board's application ofthe Ordinance to support a violation under the
facts at bar was arbitrary, capricious, and to the extent necessary, constituted an abuse of discretion.
At the very least, the application of Ordinance No. 374 to these facts, sufficient to find a violation,
was unsuppOIted by substantial evidence or, essentially, any evidence.
D.

The County is Estopped to Claim a Violation Under Ordinance No. 374.

It is a general proposition that estoppel does not apply to governmental agencies. However,
it has been held that the people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same
rules of honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private citizen, and should no more be allowed
to lull a citizen to repose and confidence in what would otherwise be a false and erroneous position
than should the private citizen. See Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho
260, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). Consider the facts at bar.
Dr. Stafford, upon moving into his house, goes to the Kootenai County Building and
Planning Department and asks what he can do within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He
asks if he can plant vegetation. He is specifically advised that "re-greening" is not a problem. He
asks a second time. He is again told that "re-greening" is not a problem. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0066.
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Based on the foregoing, Dr. Stafford plants vegetation within the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone. He also replaces or adds to previously-existing sand (a point established by the record)
and places basalt boulders indigenous to the area within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He
also completed the installation of a barbeque pit that is only partially within the twenty-five (25) foot
set-back zone.
And what does the County do? The County sends someone out to take pictures of the
Stafford property in 2001 and 2002. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Armed with photographs of
the very substance of what it now claims to constitute a violation, what does the County do?
Nothing. Five years pass.
In the interim, the Staffords apply for a permit to build an addition to their home. This
requires a second Site Disturbance permit. Silt fences are placed at or near the twenty-five (25) foot
set-back zone. The County inspects the project. No one says anything. In fact, the County actually
signs off on a Site Plan submitted by the Staffords that shows that the barbeque pit, placed in service
five years earlier, partially lies within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. II, p.
0269.
It is only when the Staffords request a Certificate of Occupancy, and the home addition is

completed, that the County claims a violation of an Ordinance (374) that wasn't even in effect when
the County took the pictures of the offending encroachments (in 2001 and 2002) but chose to do
nothing.
This isn't a case where the Staffords have been charged with violating Ordinance No. 283.
The inapplicability of Ordinance No. 374 has been raised and noticed to the County at all times
through proceedings below, but the County has done nothing but press onward under an Ordinance
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that unquestionably post-dates the offense charged.
Under these unique facts, the County should be estopped to claim a violation under
Ordinance No. 374. The Court should so hold.

IV. CONCLUSION.
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants Douglas and Michelle
Stafford respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners, find that, as a matter oflaw, their has been no violation of Ordinance No.
374 shown (the same Ordinance being inapplicable to the facts at bar), and enter an order remanding
the matter with instructions that the violation be dismissed. The Staffords also request an award of
reasonable attorney fees and costs as incurred herein pursuant to Idaho law, including I.e. §§ 12-117
and 12-121.
DA TED this 17th day of September, 2009.

r Plaintiffs/Petitioners Stafford
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
following by hand delivery addressed as follows, this 17th day of September, 2009:
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Fax: 446-1621
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Barry McHugh
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
By: Patrick M. Braden, ISB #6020
Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-9000
Phone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621

FILED:
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OCT -9 PH I: 28

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

CV-09-2516

vs.

Case No.

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities;

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Defendants/Respondents.

COME NOW the Defendants/Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD TONDEE,
Commissioners, in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to as "the County"), by
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and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, and hereby provide the following response to Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Opening
Brief on Appeal filed with the District Court on September 17,2009.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The property which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code
violation, Code Violation No. CV07-0092 (hereinafter referred to as "the subject
property"), is owned by Dr. Douglas Stafford and Michelle Stafford (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Stafford" or individually as "Dr. Stafford" and "Ms. Stafford,"
respectively) and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833. The
subject property is legally described as Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Amended Plat of Coeur
d'Alene Lake Estates, according to the plat recorded at Book "G" of Plats, Page 479A,
Records of Kootenai County, Idaho. This property has been assigned Parcel Number
01450001 015A by the Kootenai County Assessor. A.R. p. 5-8,629.
The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was
adopted on October 15, 1996.

AR. p. 46-66.

Ordinance No. 283, which replaced

Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999.

See Appendix to Petitioners'

Opening Brief on Appeal. Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was
adopted on December 8, 2005.

AR. p. 78-97.

Section 8(8) of all three of these

ordinances provides for an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer of at least twenty-five
feet (25') in slope distance from the ordinary high water mark (hereinafter referred to as
the "no-disturbance zone"). AR. p. 57-58, 89; Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on
Appeal, p. 13.
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A building permit was issued to the subject property on July 27, 1999 (Permit No.
30796). The site plan submitted with the Application for Permit No. 30796 showed that
there was fifty feet (50') from the deck on the house to the ordinary high water mark of
Lake Coeur d'Alene. A condition of that permit specifically addressed the placement of
a Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) on the property as follows: "Lake City Engineering
need{s] to move {the] GIA out of {the] 25 foot buffer zone." The single family residence
for Permit No. 30796 was issued a Certificate of Occupancy on March 23,2000, and the
financial guarantee posted by the property owner was refunded on June 7, 2000. AR.
p.28-45.
A building permit for an addition and/or alteration to the previously approved
single family residence was issued on July 25, 2006 (Permit No. 40613). The site plan
and the engineered Site Disturbance Plan submitted with that application both show a
fifty foot (50') setback from the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur
d'Alene. These plans did not depict any development or activity within twenty-five feet
(25') of the OHWM. AR. p. 67-77.
A photograph taken by Kootenai County Assessor's Office staff in 2000,
approximately four months after the certificate of occupancy was issued in conjunction
with Permit No. 30796, showed that there was still natural vegetation existing within the
no-disturbance zone, consistent with County approvals and the application materials
provided by the owner at that time. AR. p. 9-10. A photograph taken by Assessor's
Office staff on July 11, 2001, however, showed that site disturbance work was ongoing
within the no-disturbance zone even though no application for a site disturbance permit
for such activities had been submitted.

AR. p. 11-12.
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Photographs taken by

Assessor's Office staff on July 17, 2002 show that both a manicured lawn and a rock
bulkhead had been placed within the no-disturbance zone in a manner inconsistent with
the site plans submitted and approved for Permit Nos. 30796 and 40613, and in
violation of section 8(B) of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.

AR. p. 12A-20.

Photographs of the subject property taken by Kootenai County Building and Planning
Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") staff on August 28, 2007 and
August 29,2007 show that an unpermitted waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales,
sand and boulders had all been placed within the no-disturbance zone. AR. p. 20-27.
On August 29, 2007, the Department issued a Notice of Site Disturbance
Ordinance Violation for violations of the no-disturbance zone. AR. p. 5-6. After this
Notice of Violation was issued, there were discussion and correspondence between
Stafford's representatives and the Department concerning whether a remediation plan
to return the no-disturbance zone to a natural state was necessary, and concerning
what such a plan would require. AR. p. 100-26.
The Department mailed a second Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation
letter to Stafford on March 19, 2008. This notice stated that Stafford had thirty (30) days
to appeal the violation, and absent an appeal, had forty-five (45) days to resolve the
violation.

A.R. p. 127-32.

On March 21, 2008, John Magnuson, legal counsel for

Stafford, submitted an appeal of the March 19, 2008 Notice of Violation. A.R. p. 138.
An appeal hearing was held before Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key
on October 2, 2008. A.R. p. 317-22; Tr. p. 1-36.

At that appeal hearing, Ms. Key

received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, and from Building
and Planning Department staff. AR. p. 200-316,328-92,394-467; Tr. p. 3-35. Ms. Key

O0 I),...
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issued a decision denying the appeal and affirming the Department's issuance of the
Notice of Violation on October 15,2008, though she did recommend that a rescheduling
fee in the amount of $240 be refunded. AR. p. 468-83.
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") held an appeal hearing on this matter on February 12, 2009. AR. p. 586-91;
Tr. p. 37-99. At that appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from
Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, Ms. Stafford, and from Building and Planning Department
staff. AR. p. 596-610; Tr. p. 38-70,75-89. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan were given
the opportunity to explain why they were "affected persons," but were not allowed to
testify to the merits of the appeal. Tr. p. 70-74.
After hearing testimony
deliberations on the appeal.

and

receiving

Tr. p. 90-98.

evidence,

the

Board

conducted

The Board found that the testimony and

evidence showed that there had been disturbances dating back to 2001 within the nodisturbance zone required under section 8(B) of Ordinance No. 283, the Site
Disturbance Ordinance in effect at that time. The Board further found that the state of
this buffer was an ongoing violation of the provisions of the Site Disturbance Ordinance
as set forth in both Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374 (and which was originally
set forth in Ordinance No. 251). The Board also found that the work performed within
the no-disturbance zone did not predate the enactment of Ordinance No. 251, which
was when the no-disturbance zone was first established. The Board concurred with the
Hearing Examiner's analysis of the meaning of the term "supersede," which concluded
that it was intended to be synonymous with the term "replace," but was not intended to
be interpreted to mean "render null and void." A.R. p. 622-23; Tr. p. 90-96.
n'7
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The Board required Stafford to have a design professional prepare a plan for the
remediation of the no-disturbance zone, which would be subject to approval by the
Department. The work set forth in the plan was then to be completed as weather and
lake level conditions permitted. AR. p. 623; Tr. p. 97. The Board did specifically allow
the barbeque pit straddling the boundary of the no-disturbance zone to remain, since it
had been depicted on plans previously approved by the Department. AR. p. 623; Tr. p.
92-93, 97. The Board also concurred with the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that
the $240.00 rescheduling fee be refunded to Stafford. AR. p. 623-24; Tr. p. 90-91, 97.
The Board issued a written Order of Decision denying the request on March 19,
2009. A.R. p. 616-24; Tr. p. 100-03. The Board issued an Amended Order of Decision
changing the timeline for compliance on April 16, 2009. AR. p. 742-50; Tr. p. 104-08.
Stafford timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's decision on March 27,
2009, and filed a First Amended Petition for Judicial Review on April 24, 2009. AR. p.
722-32,751-61.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was in

violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance.
2.

Whether the decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was arbitrary,

capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and/or not supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole.
3.

Whether the County should be estopped from citing Stafford for a violation

of Ordinance No. 274.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of planning and zoning decisions made by a board of county
commissioners under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), Idaho Code § 67-6501

et seq., is to be made the same manner as that of any administrative determination or
order in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code § 67-

5201 et seq (IAPA). See Idaho Code § 67-6519. Thus, in such cases, the board of
county commissioners is the "agency" for purposes of judicial review under the IAPA.
The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is as follows:
(1)

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

(3)

When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4)

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section,
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced.

Idaho Code § 67-5279; see also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County,
145 Idaho 121,126,176 P.3d 126,131 (2007).
LLUPA requires counties to submit written decisions in all planning and zoning
matters, and include findings of fact and conclusions of law in such decisions. Idaho
Code § 67-6535(b). Judicial review of such orders is limited to the record. Balser v.

Kootenai County, 110 Idaho 37, 39, 714 P.2d 6, 8 (1986).
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As to the weight of the

evidence on questions of fact, the Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the

zoning agency. Neighbors, 145 Idaho at 126,176 P.3d at 131. Instead, the Court must
defer to the county's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Planning
and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including the
agency's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. Id.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was not in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance.
1.

The conduct at issue constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(8) of
the Site Disturbance Ordinance then in effect from the summer of 2001 to
date.

The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was
adopted on October 15, 1996.

A.R. p. 46-65.

Ordinance No. 283, which replaced

Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999.

See Appendix to Petitioners'

Opening Brief on Appeal. Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was

adopted on December 8,2005. A.R. p. 78-97.
Section 8(8) of Ordinance No. 251 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer sha/l
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in
width or length), or a tram sha/l be a/lowed to encroach within the buffer.
The buffer sha/l be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water
marks sha/l be considered to be the fo/lowing elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.GV.D. 1929 datum) ....
A.R. p. 57-58. Section 8(8) of Ordinance No. 283 reads, in pertinent part, as fo/lows:
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer sha/l
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be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer.
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water
marks shall be considered to be the following elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G.v.D. 1929 datum) ....
Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 13. Section 8(8) of Ordinance No.

374 (codified at section 11-2-6(8) of the Kootenai County Code) reads, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer.
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water
marks shall be considered to be the following elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G.v.D. 1929 datum) ....
A.R. p. 89. It is readily apparent that the language of the Site Disturbance Ordinance
regarding the no-disturbance zone is identical in Ordinance Nos. 251,283, and 374.
Department staff documented, through testimony and photographs obtained from
the County Assessor in 2001 and photographs taken by Department staff in 2008, that
Stafford caused site disturbances to occur, and work to be performed, within the nodisturbance zone during the summer of 2001. See A.R. p. 9-27. Stafford admitted as
much at the hearings on this appeal. Stafford has attempted to argue, however, that
because the work occurred in 2001, while Ordinance No. 283 was in effect, it should not
be enforced as a violation of Ordinance No. 374 (notwithstanding the identical relevant
language).
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What this argument ignores is the fact that the landscaping within the nodisturbance zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at
any given time.

Each ordinance has mandated that a 25-foot "undisturbed natural

vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront" on all property fronting Lake Coeur
d'Alene. (Emphasis added.) The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured
lawns, swales, sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day
they continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of however
aesthetically pleasing these features may be.

Therefore, it was perfectly lawful and

appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of this provision of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect, Ordinance No. 374.
2.

The ongoing nature of this violation renders the argument over the
meaning of the term "supersede" moot. Alternatively, this term should be
construed to mean "replace" rather than "render null and void."

Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was
in violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance
was improper because the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance
No. 283. As discussed above, however, this ignores the fact that the violation at issue
is ongoing in nature. A violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time
the first disturbance occurred in the summer of 2001 until Ordinance No. 374 took effect
on December 12, 2005, and a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day
from that date forward. Therefore, this issue of the meaning of "supersede" as used in
Ordinance No. 374 is moot.

0, 0 R
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In addition, this language must be read in conjunction with section 1-2-3 of the
Kootenai County Code, which was adopted via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337,
effective as of August 30,2004. This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance
whether such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any
offense committed against such former ordinance or as to any act done,
any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or
claim arising under the former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect
any such offense or act so committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture
or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or claim arising before the
new ordinance takes effect.. ..
K.C.C. § 1-2-3. 1 This language specifically provides that an ordinance violation may
continue to be prosecuted even after a new ordinance is enacted which has the effect of
replacing or superseding the ordinance in effect at the time of the violation, or even if
the new ordinance expressly repeals the ordinance previously in effect. Therefore, the
discussion of the effect of the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 as superseding
Ordinance No. 283 is of no import.
Even if the Court were to consider the fact that Ordinance No. 374 superseded
Ordinance No. 283 to be relevant to its decision, the citation for violating the nodisturbance zone requirement was proper nevertheless.

No Idaho appellate opinion

has· provided a definitive definition for the word "supersede."

However, a recent

decision of the Montana Supreme Court employed the following definition: "Supersede
is defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as '2: to take the place, room, or
position of; 3: to displace in favor of another.'" Pula v. State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont.
2002).2

This definition more accurately describes the effect of the adoption of

1 A true and correct copy of Ordinance No. 337, with section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code attached,
is provided as Appendix "Au to this brief.
2

A copy of Pula is provided as Appendix "S" to this brief.

O8 1
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Ordinance No. 374, as it pertained to the same subject matter and replaced Ordinance
No. 283 as of its effective date of December 12, 2005.
It is true that from that date forward, Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or
effect. This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect
until December 12, 2005, however. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurd
result of making conduct which was unlawful at the time it occurred suddenly lawful as a
nonconforming use. A nonconforming use is in fact a use of property which was lawful
at the time it was established but is not in compliance with ordinance provisions
currently in effect. Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340,
1341-42 (1989).

This "grandfather right" simply "protects the owner from abrupt

termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on the property" but "does not
extend beyond this purpose." Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658
P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the interpretation of the effect
of the word "supersede" advanced by Stafford would turn the longstanding legal
principle of nonconforming uses on its head.
3.

The decision of the Board properly applied the language of Section 8(B) of
the Site Disturbance Ordinance to the facts of this case.

Stafford argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was
improper because the Department failed to show that the work performed within the nodisturbance zone had any significant adverse effects. Stafford also contends that the
work actually had a beneficial effect, as it cleaned up the pre-existing slash pile and
noxious weeds which were present in that area.
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These arguments miss the point, which is that this property is required, and at all
relevant times has been required, to maintain a 25-foot undisturbed natural vegetation

buffer from the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene (defined as 2,125' per
N.G.V.D. 1929 datum, which is equivalent to 2,128' per Avista datum).

The no-

disturbance zone serves the purpose of the Site Disturbance Ordinance by minimizing
the risk of erosion, sedimentation and runoff (whether from stormwater or human
activity) into Kootenai County's lakes, and particularly Lake Coeur d'Alene, from
whatever source.

See AR. p. 78.

It is not necessary, however, to prove actual

"significant adverse effects" in order to cite a property owner for a violation of any
provision of this ordinance, including the no-disturbance zone mandate - particularly
when the facts supporting the citation are undisputed.
With respect to the alleged beneficial effect of the features placed within the nodisturbance zone, it may well be that these features are more aesthetically pleasing
than was the case prior to their placement within the no-disturbance zone. However,
when one looks below the surface, such features in such close proximity to the lake are
not necessarily beneficial. Added sand quickly washes into the lake, particularly during
periods of high water. Lawns typically are watered, and are often fertilized. Thus, the
Site Disturbance Ordinance requires that stormwater treatment occur landward of the
no-disturbance zone. See AR. p. 87, 89. Otherwise, nutrients would flow unchecked
into the lake. Water features such as the one on the Stafford property are not allowed
in the no-disturbance zone for the same reasons.
boulders also slowly erode over time.

See AR. p. 27.

Rock walls and

The Board recognized that what may be

aesthetically pleasing is not necessarily beneficial to the environment, and thus ordered

091

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 13
H:\Building and Planning\Stafford CV-09-2516\Brief of Respondents.doc

that the no-disturbance zone be remediated to a more natural state as determined by a
design professional, as defined in the Site Disturbance Ordinance, in a remediation plan
approved by the Department. See A.R. p. 79, 623, 626.
The undisputed evidence shows that there is an ongoing violation of the nodisturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance on the Stafford property,
regardless of whether this violation has itself caused any "significant adverse effects" on
Lake Coeur d'Alene. Therefore, the Board correctly applied the language of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance, which has remained unchanged since the activities at issue
began, to the facts of this case. Accordingly, its decision that Stafford was properly
cited for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance should be affirmed.
B.

The decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and was not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion.
1.

The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed
evidence in the record.

The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp
v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 42-43, 981 P.2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999). It is "less

than a preponderance of evidence, but more than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Fremont
County, 143 Idaho 501, 517, 148 P.3d 1247, 1263 (2006). Substantial evidence "need

not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to a certain conclusion; it
need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds
could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder." Id.
As discussed above, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation
of the no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently exists
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on the Stafford property. Therefore, the Board's decision that the Department properly
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was based on
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
2.

The decision of the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

A decision of a governing board will be considered "arbitrary and capricious," and
an abuse of the governing board's discretion, only if it was made "without a rational
basis, or in disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining
principles." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d
776,780 (2007). As long as the governing board has been found to have acted within
the bounds of its discretion, however, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the governing board. Id. Where reasonable minds may differ, "an action is
not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even
though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Enterprise,
Inc. v. City of Nampa, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975).

As discussed above, the Board took the facts and circumstances set forth in the
undisputed evidence into account in making the decision that a violation of the nodisturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance did occur and did
currently exists on the Stafford property, and that the Department properly cited Stafford
for that violation. This decision thus had a rational basis and was based on adequate
determining principles. Therefore, the Board's decision that the Department properly
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion.
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C.

The County should not be found to be estopped from citing Stafford for
violations of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.
Stafford correctly notes that the doctrine of estoppel is generally not applied

against governmental entities, and also correctly states that Idaho courts have refused
to impose an absolute bar on the application of estoppel against governmental entities,
particularly if the entity is acting in a proprietary or business capacity. See Murtaugh

Hwy. Dist. v. Twin Falls Hwy. Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579, 582 (1943).

The

doctrine of estoppel, however, is strongly disfavored in cases involving a governmental
entity acting in a governmental or discretionary capacity, as is the case when it is acting
to enforce duly enacted land use ordinances.
In Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973), the Idaho
Supreme Court discussed the history of its prior decisions regarding the application of
. estoppel against governmental entities, and also discussed the fact that some
jurisdictions had refused to do so in any circumstance concerning the enactment or
enforcement of zoning regulations, while other jurisdictions would do so only under
"extraordinary circumstances." Harrell, 95 Idaho at 247-48, 506 P.2d at 474-75. The

Harrell Court then adopted the "extraordinary circumstances" rule, and found that no
exigency existed such as would estop the City of Lewiston from refusing to issue a
building permit on the basis that the property at issue was zoned F (Farm) rather than
C-3 (Commercial).
In a later decision, the Idaho Supreme Court had occasion to apply the Harrell
rule to facts very similar to those present in this case. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates,

Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). That case concerned the
application of a development agreement originally entered into in 1973, and whether a
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subsequent rezoning of the property subject to the agreement in 1993 constituted a
violation of that agreement. Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 578-80,903 P.2d at 743-45. In that
case, the City of Hailey conceded that the property owner's predecessor in interest had
fulfilled the terms and conditions of the agreement. Id. at 579, 903 P.2d at 744. The
then-current property owner had contended that the City of Hailey should have been
estopped from changing its position as to its obligations under the development
agreement, since the City had "received the benefit of its bargain." Id. at 582-83, 903
P.2d at 747-48. The Sprenger Court, however, found that the application of estoppel
was not appropriate because the City did not breach the agreement, the agreement did
not impose a "regulatory freeze" on the property in question, and the property owner did
not rely to its detriment on the prior zoning as opposed to the new zoning. Id. at 582-83 ,
903 P.2d at 747-48.
Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has had occasion to extend the rule
from Harrell and Sprenger to a case involving a subdivision application . Terrazas v.
Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,198-201,207 P.3d 169, 174-77 (2009). In that case , the

property owners had applied for preliminary subdivision approval based on planning
staff's interpretation that the property in question did not lie within Blaine County's
"Mountain Overlay District" (MOD) .

Id. at 196-97, 207 P.3d at 172-73.

They had

contended that because they had relied on this interpretation to their detriment in the
form of expenditures of large sums of money in preparing the subdivision application,
the county should be estopped from denying the application on the basis that the
property was within the MOD.

Id. at 200, 207 P.3d at 176.

The Supreme Court,

however, once again declined to apply the doctrine of estoppel in this matter, expressly
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finding that to do so would "strip the [governing] boards of their sole statutory authority
to approve or deny subdivision applications." Id. at 200-01,207 P.3d at 176-77.
In this case, the police power being exercised by the County is the power to
enforce its duly enacted ordinances - in particular, the Site Disturbance Ordinance .
Therefore, the Court should find that the cases which strongly disfavor the application of
estoppel against a governmental entity acting in a governmental capacity are controlling
in this case.
Stafford places much emphasis on the fact that an unnamed Department
employee told Dr. Stafford that "re-greening is not a problem." See Tr. p. 66. Although
"re-greening" could be construed to mean planting native vegetation, Dr. Stafford
apparently took this to mean he could plant what eventually became a manicured lawn
within the no-disturbance zone. More egregiously, Stafford then went far beyond what
may have been simply an erroneous or misunderstood statement in also placing such
features as a rock bulkhead, a water feature flowing directly into the lake, additional
sand, and basalt boulders within this area.

While the County did issue a site

disturbance permit in conjunction with the building permit for the addition, this permit did
not authorize either then-existing or future disturbances in the no-disturbance zone.
Terrazas confirmed once and for all that the Board is the final arbiter of how its
land use ordinances should be interpreted, and that such pronouncements govern over
contrary interpretations made by Department staff.
201, 207 P.3d at 174-77.

See Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 198-

Thus, misunderstood or erroneous advice given by a

Department staff member or a site inspection which does not immediately lead to a
citation for an ordinance violation cannot be used as a basis to estop the County from

096

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 18
H:\Building and Planning\Stafford CV-09-2S16\Brief of Respondents.doc

taking action to enforce its land use ordinances. The only potential basis for estoppel
was taken care of by the Board in its decision allowing the barbeque pit to remain
notwithstanding the fact that it was partially within the no-disturbance zone, since it was
depicted as straddling the no-disturbance zone boundary in the site plan approved by
the Department. Otherwise, the violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement was
the direct result of actions taken by Stafford, and it is Stafford's responsibility to
remediate it to where it is in a more natural state.

v. CONCLUSION
Because the placement and maintenance of certain features within the Stafford
property's no-disturbance zone constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(B) of the
Site Disturbance Ordinance then in effect, whether Ordinance No. 283 or Ordinance No.
374, it is unnecessary to determine the effect of the latter having superseded the
former. If the Court were to find that the meaning of the term "supersede" is relevant, it
should find that it means "replace" rather than to "render null and void," as the latter
meaning would have the effect of legalizing and "grandfathering" actions after the fact
which were unlawful at the time the act occurred. Thus, the Court should find that the
Board did not act in violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions in
finding that the Department properly cited Stafford for violating Section 8(B) of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance.
The evidence concerning Stafford's activities in the no-disturbance zone is well
supported in the record, and is generally undisputed. The Board also had a rational
basis for the decision, and gave serious consideration to the evidence and testimony in
the record.

Therefore, the Court should also find that the Board's decision was

097

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 19
H:\Building and Planning\Stafford CV-09-2516\Brief of Respondents.doc

supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of the Board's discretion.

In addition, the Court should decline Stafford's

invitation to find that the Board should be estopped from interpreting its own ordinances
or exercising its police power in enforcing them in this matter.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board of County
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 (pertaining to Code Violation No. CV07 -0092)
should be AFFIRMED.
Dated this

9-fh

day of October, 2009.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the utrln day of October, 2009, I caused to be sent a true
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile (FAX) to:
John F. Magnuson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 W. Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814
Fax: (208) 667-0500

Patrick M. Braden
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Minutes of Meeting
August 24, 2004
2:00 p.m.

The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Chairman Panabaker, Commissioner
Johnson and Commissioner Currie met in a continuation of the regular meeting of the
second Monday of August with Deputy Clerk Sandy Maitland present. Also present was
Chief Legal Counsel Erika Ellingsen.

Ordinance 337 Adopting the County Code
The Board met to consider the adoption of Ordinance 337 which officially adopts a
method of perpetual codification together with the continuous supplement service
provided by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. From and after the date of passage of this ordinance,
the County Code of Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing
the compilation of all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to
said ordinances, under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted
in all courts without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the
County Commissioners.
Commissioner Currie moved that the Board approve Ordinance 337 Adopting the
County Code. Commissioner Johnson seconded the motion.
There being no discussion, Deputy Clerk Sandy Maitland called the roll;
Commissioner Currie:
Commissioner Johnson:
Chairman Panabaker:

Aye
Aye
Aye

The motion carried.
Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK

BY:~M,ru±otlrruL
DeputyCl

c:

Ordinance File
Sterling Codifiers
Law Library
Bldg. & Planning
KCSO
Public Defender

Prosecuting Attorney

iOO

ORDINANCE NO. 337
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING
THE KOOTENAI COUN1Y, IDAHO COUNTY CODE
BE IT ORDAINED by the County Commissioners of the County of Kootenai County,
Idaho, as follows:
.

Section 1: From and after the date of passage of this ordinance, the County Code
of the County of Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing
the compilation of all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to
said ordinances, under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted
in all courts without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the
County Commissioners.

Section

There is hereby adopted, as a method of perpetual codification, the
loose-leaf type of binding together with the continuous supplement service, provided by
Sterling Codifiers, Inc., whereby each newly adopted ordinance of a general and
permanent nature amending, altering, adding or deleting provisions of the official County
Code is identified by the proper catchline and is inserted in the proper place in each of the
official copies, one copy of which shall be maintained in the office of the County Clerk,
certified as to correctness and available for inspection at any and all times that said office
is regularly open.
2:

Section 3: All ordinances of a gen~ral nature included in this official County Code
shall be considered as a continuation of said ordinance provision and the fact that some
provisions have been deliberately eliminated by the governing body shall not serve to
cause any interruption in the continuous effectiveness of ordinances included in said
official County Code. All ordinances of a special nature, such as tax levy ordinances, bond
ordinances, franchises, vacating ordinances and annexation ordinances shall continue in
full force and effect unless specifically repealed or amended by a provision of the County
Code. Such ordinances are not intended to be included in the official County Code.
Ordinance No. 337
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101

Section 4: It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to change or
amend by.additions or deletions, any part or portion of such code, or to insert or delete
pages or portions thereof, or to alter or tamper with such code in any manner whatsoever
which will cause the law of the County to be misrepresented thereby,
Section 5: All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith, are, to the
extent of such conflict, hereby repealed.

Section 6: This ordinance and the code adopted by the same shall be recorded
and shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage, approval and publication as
provided by law.
SECfION 32. EFFECfIVE DATE; This Ordinance shall take full force upon its
approval, passage, and publication on one (1) edition of the Coeur d'Alene Press, a
newspaper of general circulation within Kootenai County, Idaho.
APPROVED by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on the

AaA~-t

, 2004·

KOOTENAI COUNTY
ARD OF COMMISSIONERS
.--"--.

ATIEST:
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK

-f_______,

Publication Date: _ _
B_...""'80=-.,-_(). . .

2004

ordinance No. 337
Page 2 of 2

102

aY-4.h day of

NOTICE OF ORDINANCE ADOPTION

The Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, hereby gives notice of the
adoption of Kootenai County Ordinance No. 337. The full text of the ordinance
addresses the following subject:
From and after the date of passage of this ordinance, the County Code of the County of
Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing the compilation of
all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to said ordinances,
under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted in all courts
without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the County
Commissioners.
There is hereby adopted, as a method of perpetual codification, the loose-leaf type of
binding together with the continuous supplement service, provided by Sterling Coclifiers,
Inc., whereby each newly adopted ordinance of a general and permanent nature amending,
altering, adding or deleting provisions of the official County Code is identified by the
proper catchIine and is inserted in the proper place in each of the official copies, one copy
of which shall be maintained in the office of the County Clerk, certified as to correctness
and available for inspection at any and all times that said office is regularly open.
The full text of Ordinance 337 is available at the Kootenai County Commissioners Office,
451 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814, weekdays, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

~eC2~

ATTEST:
DANIEL J. ENGLISH
By:

Richard C. Panabaker, Chairman

Publication Date: Monday, 8/30/04
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CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the attached Notice of Ordinance Adoption contains a
true and complete summary of Ordinance No. 337 of Kootenai County, Idaho,
and that the attached summary provides adequate notice to the public of the
contents of said Ordinance.
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CHAPTER 2

/'

SA VING CLAUSE

SECTION:
1-2-1:
1-2-2:
1-2-3:
1-2-4: .

Repeal Of General Ordinances
Public Utility Ordinances
Court Proceedings
Severability Clause

REPEAL OF GENERAL ORDINANCES: All general
ordinances of the county passed prior to the adoption of this
code are hereby repealed, except such as are included in this code or are
by necessary implication herein reserved from repeal (subject to the saving
clauses contained in the following sections), and excluding the following
ordinances which are not hereby repealed: tax levy ordinances;
appropriation ordinances; contract ordinances and ordinances authorizing
the execution of a contract or the issuance of warrants; ordinances relating
to the transfer or acceptance of real estate by or from the county;
ordinances authorizing a zone change; ordinances authorizing a bond
issue; and all special ordinances. (2004 Code)
1-2-1:

PUBLIC UTILITY ORDINANCES: No ordinance relating to
railroad crossings with streets and other public ways, or
relating to the conduct, duties, services or rates of public utilities shall be
repealed by virtue of the adoption of this code or by virtue of the preceding
section, excepting as this code may contain provisions for such matters, in
which case this code shall be considered as amending such ordinance or
ordinances in resp~ct to such provisions only. (2004 Code)
1-2-2:

COURT PROCEEDINGS: No new ordinance shall be
construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether such
former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture
or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the
1-2-3:
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1-2-4

1-2-3

former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act
so committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so
incurred or any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance
takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform to the
ordinance in force at the time of such proceeding, so far as practicable. If
any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provision of a new
ordinance, such provision may be, by consent of the party affected, applied
to any judgment announced after the new ordinance takes effect.
This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or
implication, whether the repeal is in the ordinance making any new
provisions upon the same subject or in any other ordinance.

(

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as abating any action
now pending under or by virtue of any general ordinance of the county
herein repealed and the provisions of all general ordinances contained in
this code shall be deemed to be continuing provisions and not a new
enactment of the same provision;' nor shall this chapter be deemed as
discontinuing, abating, modifying or altering any penalty accrued or to
accrue, or as affecting the liability of any person, firm or corporation, or as
waiving any right of the county under any ordinance or provision thereof in
force at the time of the adoption of this code. (2004 Code)

SEVERABILITY CLAUSE: If any section, subsection,
subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase of this
code or any part thereof is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or
invalid or ineffective by any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision
shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the remaining portions of this
code, or any part thereof. The board of county commissioners hereby
declares that they would have passed each section, subsection,
subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase hereof irrespective of
the fact that anyone or more sections, subsections, subdivisions,
paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases be declared unconstitutional,
invalid or ineffective. (2004 Code)
1-2-4:

G
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(

)

'-.--

106

Kootenai County

APPENDIX B

107

Westlaw..
40 P.3d 364
308 Mont 122,40 P.3d 364,2002 MT 9
(Cite as: 308 Mont. 122, 40 P.3d 364)

Page 1

c
Supreme Court of Montana.
Wendy Michael PULA, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
STATE of Montana, Defendant and Respondent
No. 99-315.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVJ(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k970 Reception of Evidence
30k970(2) k. Rulings on Admissibility
of Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases
Trial 388 ~43

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 27,2001.
Decided Jan. 25,2002.
Arrestee brought negligence action against the State
after she was raped by a male inmate while she was
jailed pending an appearance before a judge. The
District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
Blaine County, John C. McKeon, J., entered judgment in favor of the State. Arrestee appealed. The
Supreme Court, Leaphart, J., held that: (1) evidence
regarding the conduct of the county and the conduct
of inmate was admissible in arrestee's negligence
action against the State; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support submission of the case to
the jury; and (3) the State's jury instructions on independent intervening causation did not warrant reversal ofjudgment
Affinned.
TrieweiIer, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Nelson, J.,joined.
West H eadnotes

ill Appeal and Error 30 <£:=:>964
30 Appeal and Error
30XVJ Review
30XVl(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k963 Proceedings Preliminary to Trial
30k964 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews a District Court's grant or
denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion.

ill Appeal and Error 30 <£:=:>970(2)

388 Trial
388IV Reception of Evidence
388IVCA) Introduction, Offer, and Admission
of Evidence in General
388k43 k. Admission of Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases
The District Court has broad discretion to determine
if evidence is admissible; accordingly, absent an
abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court will not overturn the District Court's determination.

ill States 360 ~112.2(4)
360 States
360m Property, Contracts, and Liabilities
360kl12 Torts
360k1 12.2 Nature of Act or Claim
360k1 12.2(4) k. State Institutions, Injuries in Operation Of. Most Cited Cases
Evidence regarding the conduct of the county and the
conduct of inmate was admissible in arrestee's negligence action against the State, and thus arrestee was
not entitled to a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of intervening and superseding causes of arrestee's
injuries; the evidence was relevant on the issue of
causation of arrestee's injuries while she was in jail
pending an appearance before a jUdge.

ill Trial 388 ~139.1(7)
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VJ(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in
General
388k139.1 Evidence
388kI39.1(5) Submission to or Withdrawal from Jury
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388kI39.1(7) k. "No" Evidence; Total Failure of Proof. Most Cited Cases

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVJ(J)J 8 Instructions
30kl068 Error Cured by Verdict or
Judgment
30kJ 068(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
The State's jury instructions on independent intervening causation did not warrant reversal of judgment,
even though the instructions may not have been correct statements of the law, where the instructions
stated that if the jury found that the State's negligence
did not cause injury to arrestee the jury was to sign
the verdict form and notifY the bailiff it had reached a
verdict, the jury found that the State's negligence did
not cause injury to arrestee, and the intervening causation jury instructions were later in the special verdict form and were not even addressed by the jury.

Trial3881C=>178
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VleD) Direction of Verdict
388kJ 78 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Considering all evidence in the light most favorable
to the opposing party, judgment as a matter of law is
properly granted only when there is a complete absence of any evidence which would justifY submitting
an issue to the jury. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule SOfa).

1.£ States 360 ~112.2(4)
360 States
360m Property, Contracts, and Liabilities
360kJ 12 Torts
360kl12.2 Nature of Act or Claim
360klI2.2(4) k. State Institutions, Injuries in Operation Of. Most Cited Cases
The State presented sufficient evidence to support
submission of the case to the jury, and thus arrestee
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in
negligence action; evidence that the sheriff and jail
employees failed to follow the State's guidelines concerning the housing of inmate, the inmate's access to
the public, and the inmate's status as a trusty created
issues regarding breach and causation of arrestee's
injuries which warranted submission of the case to
the jury. Rules Clv.Proc., Rule SO(a).

.llil Trial 388 €='295(1)
388 Trial
388VII Instructions to Jury
388VII(G) Construction and Operation
3881<295 Construction and Effect of Charge
as a Whole
388k295(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The Supreme Court reviews jury instructions to determine whether the instructions as a whole fully and
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the
case.

11l Appeal and Error 30 <C=:>1068(1)

**365 *123 For Appellant: Robert M. Peterson, Peterson Law Office, Daniel A. Boucher, Altman &
Boucher, Havre, MT.
For Respondent: Dana L. Christensen, Christensen,
Moore, Cockrell, Cummings & Axelberg, P.C., Kalispell, MT.
Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the
Opinion of the Court.
~ 1 Wendy M. Pula (Pula) appeals the verdict and
judgment in favor of the State of Montana (State), in
the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Blaine County. Pula contends that the District Court erred when it
denied her motion in limine to exclude evidence of
third party misconduct, that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the District Court improperly instructed the jury on intervening and superseding cause. We affIrm the verdict and
judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
~

2 This matter arises out of a suit filed in United
States District Court by Pula against the State of
Montana, the City of Chinook, three Chinook police
officers, Blaine County, and the Sheriff of Blaine
County. All claims against the 9ty of Chinook,
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Blaine County, and *124 their officers and employees were dismissed following settlement with
Pula. The United States DistriCt Court dismissed the
pendant claim for negligence against tht: Slate of
Montana, allowing Pula to refile in state court. Pula
then sued the State in Blaine County, alleging negligence in the incarceration, monitoring and control of
Montana State Prison inmate Chester Bauer. Bauer
has a history of sexual assaults against women and
had been serving sentences at the Montana State
Prison for sexual intercourse without consent, aggravated assault and felony intimidation. However, after
being assaulted by fellow inmates and testifYing
against them, the State arranged to have Bauer
housed in the Blaine County Jail for his own protection.
~

3 The record indicates that Bauer came to be on
quite friendly terms with his jailers in Blaine County.
He was allowed to roam **366 the facility at will,
had access to keys and was permitted to work in and
outside the jail wearing civilian clothes. He also ran
errands for the jail staff
~

4 Pula, a twenty-year-old female, had been ticketed
for minor in possession of alcohol. After failing to
appear in court for the ticket, she was picked up by
police and taken to the Blaine County Jail. For whatever reason, either because she had no money or was
afraid or unwilling to call a friend or relative for assistance, Pula could not post bond and was jailed
pending an appearance before a judge. Because all
cells in the women's block were full, officers put Pula
in one of the jail's solitary confinement cells.
~ 5 The next day, Bauer came to visit Pula in her cell.
He introduced himself, asked if she was okay, and
asked her if there was anything he could do to help
her. Pula later testified at trial that, since Bauer was
dressed in civilian clothes and seemed to have free
run of the place, she believed that he worked at the
jail. She also remembered seeing him around the grocery store where she worked.
~

6 During the course of the day, May 26, ] 995, Bauer and Pula exchanged a series of notes. Later that
night, at approximately 3 :00 a.m., Bauer came back
to Pula's cell. Using the jail keys, he unlocked her
cell and invited her to his, ostensibly to watch TV.
Pula went willingly. While in his cell, however, Bauer began to fondle Pula. When she protested he told

her that he had stolen the keys and, if anyone found
out she was out of her cell, she would go to prison for
ten years for escape. Bauer then raped her. Afterwards, he returned Pula to her cell and locked her in.
Pula said nothing about the incident to jail officials
but reported the rape to friends the next day.
*125 , 7 In the ensuing criminal trial, Bauer was
convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, intimidation and misdemeanor escape. Pula also filed a
civil complaint in the United States District Court
alleging negligence and violation of 42 U.S.C. § ]983
against the City of Chinook, three Chinook police
officers, Blaine County, the Sheriff of Blaine County,
and the State of Montana. All claims against parties
other than the State were dismissed following settlement with those parties. The United States District
Court dismissed the Uill claim against the State
and then ruled that it was without jurisdiction to hear
the pendent negligence claim. Pula then refiled her
negligence claim against the State in the Seventeenth
Judicial District Court, Blaine County.
~ 8 In her complaint, Pula alleged that the State
breached its duty of care in the incarceration, supervision and control of Bauer and that this breach resulted in Bauer's attack and Pula's resulting psychological and economic damages. The State denied negligence and argued that any damages sustained by
Pula were the result of independent and unforeseeable intervening acts: in particular, the negligence of
the other defendants named in the original federal
suit, the contributory negligence of Pula herself and
Bauer's intentional act.

, 9 At trial Pula sought to prevent the State from presenting evidence concerning the negligence, fault, or
conduct of non-parties to her complaint, including
but not limited to Blaine County, the City of Chinook, Blaine County officials and Bauer, himself.
She contended that such evidence represented an impermissible attempt to apportion liability to nonparties. The State argued that such evidence was admissible as proof of an intervening cause of Pula's
injuries. The District Court denied Pula's motion in
limine, allowing such evidence for the purpose of
demonstrating an intervening or superseding cause
for Pula's claimed injuries but not for the purpose of
attempting to allocate liability to non-parties.
, 10 At the close of trial, the District Court submitted
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its own proposed jury instructions. These included
instructions on the meaning of intervening and superseding cause, to which Pula objected. In addition, the
District Court submitted a special verdict form which
required the jury to first decide if the State was negligent and, if so, whether that negligence was a cause
of any injury or damage to Pula. If the jury answered
no to the causation question, it was instructed to go
no further. If it answered yes, it was to determine
whether there was an intervening or **367 superseding cause. The jury determined that the State was
negligent but that its negligence was not a cause of
Pula's *126 injuries.
, 1] Pula raises the following issues on appeal:
, 12 Issue 1. Did the District Court err when it denied
Pula's motion in limine to exclude evidence of intervening and superseding causes of Pula's injuries?
, 13 Issue 2. Was there sufficient evidence to submit
the case to the jury?
, 14 Issue 3. Did the District Court's jury instructions
and verdict form incorrectly instruct the jury on the
law of intervening and superseding cause?
DISCUSSION

Issue I. Did the District Court err when it denied
Pula's motion in limine to exclude evidence of intervening and superseding causes ofPula's injuries?

lllLf1 ,

15 We review a District Court's grant or
denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. Bramble v. State Dept. o(Justice. Motor Vehicle
Dill" 1999 MT 132,1/16.294 Mont. 501, 1/16, 982
P.2d 464. 1/ 16; Dill v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial
Dis!. Ct.. 1999 MT 85, 1/ 8, 294 Mont. 134,1/8.979
P.2d 188, 1l 8. The District Court has broad discretion
to determine if evidence is admissible. Accordingly,
absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn
the District Court's determination. Busta v. Columbus
Hospital Corn. (] 996),276 Mont. 342, 353, 916 P.2d
122,130.

ill ,

16 Pula contended at trial and argues now on
appeal that introduction of evidence concerning the
actions of Blaine County pernlitted the State to apportion blame or responsibility to non-party defen-
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dants. She cites our decision in Plumb v. Fourth
Judicial Dis!. Ct. (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 379, 927
P .2d 10 1 I, 1021, for the proposition that such third
party defenses violate substantive due process because juries are likely to assign a disproportionate
share of liability to unrepresented parties-thereby
reducing the recovery from the named defendant.
While we concur with her statement of our holding in
Plumb, we find it inapplicable to Pula's case.
, 17 In Plumb, we concluded that portions of the
] 995 amendments to § 27-1-703, MCA, which allowed apportionment of liability to parties who are
not named in the lawsuit, violated substantive due
process. Plumb. 279 Mont. at 379, 927 P.2d at 1021.
The issue in this case, however, is not how to apportion blame among several liable parties but whether,
because of the intervening negligence of another, the
State's acts or omissions could be said to be the cause
of Pula'S injuries. *127 Our decision in Plumb did not
disturb the validity of the intervening cause exception
to the general test for causation, and we have repeatedly upheld its validity-even after our decision in
Plumb. See State v. Schipman. 2000 MT 102, 299
Mont. ')73, 2 P.3d 223; Gento) v. Douglas Hereford
Ranch. Inc" 1998 MT 182, 290 Mont. 126,962 P.2d
1205. Evidence of the conduct of Blaine County and
Bauer was relevant to the issue of causation in Pula's
negligence claim and was properly admitted by the
District Court.

Issue 2. Was there sufficient evidence to submit the
case to the jury'?
, ] 8 Prior to submission of the case to the jury, the
District Court denied Pula's motion for judgment as a
matter of law. Motions for judgment as a matter of
law are governed by Rule 50(a), M.R.Civ.P., which
provides:

If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard
on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law against the party with
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a
favorable finding on that issue.

IiI ,

19 Considering all evidence in the light most

111
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

40 P.3d 364
308 Mont. 122,40 P.3d 364, 2002 MT 9
(Cite as: 308 Mont. 122,40 P.3d 364)

favorable to the opposing party, judgment as a matter
of law is properly granted only when there is a complete absence of any evidence which would justify
submitting an issue to the jury. Armstronl: v. Gundeiro, 2000 MT 326, 1{26, 303 Mont. 37, '1126, 15 P.3d
386, ~ 26.
**368 ~ 20 Pula argues that, absent what she considers to be improperly admitted intervening cause evidence, the State presented no evidence to counter her
claims of duty, breach, causation and damages. Our
review of the trial record does not support this contention.

ill,21

The State presented substantial evidence that
the damages suffered by Pula were not the result of
its negligent acts or omissions. Its case included testimony and documentary evidence that it did not
breach any relevant standard of care, that its acts or
omissions were not the actual or proximate cause of
Pula's injuries and that many of the economic damages for which Pula sought recovery may have been
related to events that occurred prior to the rape. The
State presented evidence that it transferred Bauer to
Blaine County for legitimate penological reasons and
did so knowing that the county jail was a secure
modem facility. It offered testimony that it provided
Blaine County officials with timely and appropriate
guidelines for Bauer'S *128 incarceration.
~ 22 There was evidence that, despite the State's
guidelines, Sheriff Harrington, shortly after Bauer's
transfer to Blaine County, unilaterally decided to
treat Bauer as a "trustee." Without any authorization
from the State, Harrington allowed Bauer to work
outside the jail and to wear civilian clothing. On September 9, 1994, approximately three months after
Bauer was transferred, Blaine County Jailer Jim
Doyle faxed a letter to Warden Mahoney requesting
pennission for Bauer to work outside the jail. Bauer's
prison supervisor, Bill Pohjola, called ~Doyle and left
a message which Doyle acknowledges having received. The message advised Doyle that Bill Pohjola
from the prison had called stating that the prison
would not "OK" Bauer to work outside the jail at that
time.

, 23 Approximately six months later, in March of
1995, Ed Schmidt, Havre Probation and Parole Officer, learned that Bauer was being treated as a "trustee." Schmidt was concerned about this state of af-
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fairs and contacted his supervisor who, in tum, contacted officials at MSP. As a result, Schmidt was
asked to conduct a more thorough review, which he
did. He subsequently filed a report with Classification Manager Candyce Neubauer and spoke with her
on the telephone. Neubauer, Pohjola and Mahoney
determined that Bauer could stay in Blaine CouI,lty if
they were assured that Blaine County would appropriately and safely incarcerate Bauer.
~ 24 Neubauer contacted Jailer Doyle and relayed her
concerns about Bauer's status. Doyle assured her that
Blaine County would appropriately and safely incarcerate Bauer. Schmidt personally met with Sheriff
Harrington, Jailer Doyle and Undersheriff Murdock
and was assured that Bauer would be properly
housed.

,25 On April 4, 1995, Neubauer sent two letters to
Blaine County, one to the Sheriff and one to Jailer
Doyle setting forth the State's concerns regarding
Bauer's incarceration. In particular, the letter reiterated that MSP officials had become "very concerned
that Chester [Bauer] was allowed into the community
unsupervised." The letter concluded with the following admonition:
Because Bauer is considered a Special Management
inmate and not a Trusty, we can not allow him to
have access to the community. We sure would like
to keep Bauer there if you don't have problems
with restricting his access to the community. He is
not to be allowed out of the jail area unsupervised.
,26 Some 24 days later, on April 28, 1995, Jailer Jim
Doyle distributed the following memo to all jail employees:
*129 Control Officers:
We need to establish some rules in dealing with
Chester. First of all, everyone remember that he is
still an inmate. He can not be hanging around in
dispatch and the jailers office visiting. This has
been happening a lot, especially at night. He comes
out and hangs around dispatch when Kara is working. I don't think this is a good idea. The general
public is not allowed to do this, so for sure an inmate shouldn't be. There are a lot of things that he
is not supposed to see. The jail roster for one, infonnation on the teletype for another. Lately if he
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cant, however, that Warden Mahoney's testimony in
this regard was inconsistent with the testimony of
Officer Schmidt. Officer Schmidt testified as follows:

needs the garage opened he just walks in and opens
it. This **369 cannot happen. There may be evidence or something in there that needs to be kept
secure.

Q:Did you know that he had access to keys?
I also found out that a few nights ago, Chester was
given the jail keys to go turn the radio off in male
cell block. Do not give Chester the keys. The
whole next day, all I heard from the other inmates,
is how come an inmate has the jail keys, and that
we should let them have them also. If word about
this ever got to the public, it could really cause
some problems. Chester is an inmate. What would
have prevented him from unlocking the other inmates if he wanted to. We would have had some
serious problems. I realize Chester is a nice person
and is doing well here, and everybody likes him,
but he is not an employee. He is a MSP inmate[.]
Remember, Chester is not to be outside of the Sheriff's Dept. without supervision. He must be monitored at all times if outside of this office. The prison has already said that if something were to happen, we would be responsible.
We will probably be getting another trustee from
the prison one of these days. Ifhe sees Chester acting like an employee, then he is going to act the
same way. We don't need that.
I have already talked to him about the deal with the
jail keys, and hanging around in the offices. Lets
not let this kind of stuff happen. We don't want
something to go wrong and end causing up some
problems that we can't deal with.
Also Chester received his paperwork today from
MSP, he was denied parole. So keep an extra close
eye on him. I don't think he would try to leave, but
I didn't think Bigby would either. I know this will
be a let down for him.

A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you ever know that?

A. No.
~ 28 Candyce Neubauer also testified that she did not
know that Bauer had access to the jail keys. Jailer
Doyle did not learn of Bauer's access to keys until
Apri.l 26 or 27, 1995, and, even then, he did not advise anyone from the State of that fact. He did, however, circulate the above memo, dated April 28, 1995,
in which he specifically and emphatically advises his
staff that Bauer was a MSP inmate and was not to
have access to the keys. Clearly there was ample evidence before the jury from which it could conclude
that Warden Mahoney was mistaken when he said
that he had been advised by Schmidt in March of
1995 that Bauer had access to the keys. The above
evidence would also explain why Neubauer's letter of
April 4 did not address the issue of Bauer's access to
the keys. First of all, there was no evidence that there
had been an access to keys problem prior to April 4;
secondly, Neubauer was never aware that Bauer had
access to keys; and fmally, even the jailer was not
aware of this until April 27 or 28.
~

29 We conclude that the State offered sufficient
evidence to submit the issue to the jury. Judgment as
a matter of law was not appropriate. The District
Court correctly denied Pula's Rule SOra), M.R.Civ.P.,
motion.

Issue 3. Did the District Court's jury instructions
and verdict form incorrectly instruct the jury on the
law ofintervening and superseding cause?

ill ~ 30

JimL. Doyle
~ 27 The dissent argues that since the State knew that
Bauer had access to the jailhouse keys, the threat to
Pula was foreseeable. This *130 contention is based
upon Warden Mahoney'S testimony that, in late
March of 1995, Officer Schmidt brought it to his attention that Bauer had access to the keys. It is signifi-

This Court reviews jury instructions to determine whether the instructions as a whole fully and
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the
case. State v. Martin, 200 J MT 83, , 23, 305 Mont.
123,123,23 P.3d216.,23.

ill ~ 3 J Pula

argues that the District Court's instructions on independent intervening causation were in-
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correct statements of **370 the law as established by
this Court in Busta. Whatever the merits of this argument, it is clear from the jury's verdict that it never
even reached the question of an intervening or superseding cause.

,32 Like the standard jury verdict form proposed by
Pula herself, the *131 District Court's special verdict
form required the jurors to answer a series of questions on breach of duty, causation and damages; moving on to succeeding questions depending on their
answer to the preceding question. On the frrst question-whether the State was negligent-the jury answered "yes." However, in response to the next question on the special verdict form-whether the State's
negligence was a cause of any injury or damage to
Pula-the jury answered "no." Having answered this
causation question in the negative, the form instructed the jury not to consider the third questionwhether there was an intervening cause. Instead it
instructed the jury to simply sign the form and notify
the bailiff that it had reached its verdict.
, 33 The dissent contends that the jury verdict only
makes sense if the jury, despite not having answered
the special verdict question, found that the County's
or Bauer's conduct was an independent intervening
cause, thereby superseding the State's negligence.
That, however, is not the only plausible explanation
for the verdict. If the jury found that the letters from
Neubauer to Blaine County officials (specifying no
unsupervised community access) and the memo from
the Blaine County jailer to his staff (to treat Bauer as
an inmate with no more access to the jail keys) cut
off any causal connection between the State's negligence and the attack on Pula, there was no necessity
for the jury to go further and address the question of
independent intervening cause.
, 34 Since the jury did not consider the issue of intervening cause in reaching its verdict, we conclude that
the District Court's instructions on intervening cause
had no effect on the outcome of the trial.
, 35 We will not reverse a civil cause by reason of
any error where the record shows that the same result
would have been attained had the error not been
committed. Rule 14. M.R.App.P. See also Stenherg v.
Neel (1980), 188 MOllt. 333, 339. 613 P.2d 1007,
l..Qll (where the jury does not reach the issue of

damages, no error can be predicated on damage instructions). The record indicates that the jury did not
reach the question of intervening cause. Therefore,
we will not assign error to the instructions addressing
that issue.

CONCLUSION
~

36 We conclude that the District Court properly
denied Pula's motion in limine to exclude the State's
evidence of an independent intervening cause of Pula's injuries. The State presented sufficient evidence
on the issues of breach and causation to warrant sending the * 132 case to the jury and Pula's motion for a
directed verdict was properly denied. Finally, the
District Court's jury instruction on intervening cause,
while not conforming to our suggestion in Busta, had
no effect on the outcome of the trial. The verdict and
judgment are affirmed.

We concur: KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., and JIM
REGNIER,J.
Honorable DOROTHY McCARTER, District Judge,
sitting in place of Justice PA TRJCIA COTTER.
Honorable ED McLEAN, District Judge, sitting in
the vacant seat of the Court as of the date of submission.
Justice TERRYN. TRIEWEILER dissents.
~ 37 I dissent from the majority's conclusions that
there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of
independent intervening cause to the jury and that the
Plaintiff suffered no harm from those instructions.
~ 38 The jury found the State of Montana negligent.
The only facts alleged as a basis for the State's negligence were that it failed to protect the Plaintiff by
adequately controlling and supervising Chester Bauer, an inmate for whom the State was responsible. It
is not logically possible for the State to have been
negligent in the manner alleged and for that negligence not to have been a contributing cause of damage to the young woman **371 that Bauer raped
while under the State's presumed control. The only
basis for finding that the State's omissions were not
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the cause of Plaintiffs damages was the Court's instruction that the chain of causation could be severed
by the independent, intervening omissions of the
county or acts of Chester Bauer. Thosc instructions
should not have been given because the intervening
acts and omissions relied on by the State were completely foreseeable. Because they were given, the
bizarre and unjust result in this case should be reversed.
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been advised by the undersheriff in Blaine County
that Bauer had access to go and come as he pleased.

'Ii 42 This information, as well as the faci that Bauer
had access to jailhouse keys, was communicated to
Mike Mahoney, the warden at the Montana State
Prison. Mahoney admitted that he had knowledge of
this information prior to Bauer's attack of Pula and
that Bauer in fact was the State's responsibility. Mahoney gave the following testimony:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
~

39 Chester Bauer is a sexual predator who was
convicted of sexual intercourse without consent in
1983 and sentenced to the Montana State Prison.
While at the Montana State Prison, in 1991, he was
convicted of intimidation for trying to extort sexual
favors from the wife of a prison employee by threatening her and her children. In addition to these two
offenses, he was serving a ten-year sentence for aggravated assault and ten years for use of a dangerous
weapon when, in 1994, he was transferred by the
State of Montana to the Blaine County jail. Presumably because of the threat that he posed to others, he
was denied parole on nine occasions-eight times prior
to his transfer to Blaine County. Blaine County prison officials were advised that he had been classified
as a minimum security inmate and they treated him
accordingly by making him a trustee.

Q. This matter regarding Mr. Bauer's detention up
here came to your attention in March of 1995, correct?
A. I believe that's correct.

Q. And it was brought to your attention because adult
probation and parole officer Ed Schmidt expressed
concerns about the fact that Mr. Bauer was even up
here, didn't he?
A. My recollection is, Mr. Schmidt had made personal contact with inmate Bauer and was deeply
troubled by the issues that he attended to in that
conversation and notified the department of his
concern.

Q. He saw a Montana State Prison inmate running
*133 ~ 40 His freedom and mobility while in Blaine
County first came to the attention of Montana State
Prison officials after he was observed in street
clothes, roaming freely about the Blaine County
courthouse by Edward Schmidt, a state probation and
parole officer. On March 21,1995, he wrote to Mike
Gersack, his supervisor, and sent a copy of his letter
to Candyce Neubauer who was in charge of classification of Montana State Prison inmates. In his letter,
he advised Gersack and Neubauer that Bauer was
being treated as a trustee at the Blaine County jail
and in that status, worked at various jobs in the city
of Chinook. His work included repairs to private vehicles for which he received payment. He had no
particular hours by which he had to return to the prison facility and, in fact, had a private vehicle at his
disposal which had been loaned to him by one of the
jailers.
~ 41 Schmidt pointed out that when he observed Bauer, he was dressed in civilian clothes and that he had

around like a trustee, didn't he?

A. I believe that would be a fair observation or assessment, yeah.
Q. The prison requested him to look into it further
and he reported back to you, did he not?

A. Yes, he did.
Q. And isn't it true that the information that was provided to you indicated that Mr. Bauer had freedom
to come and go as he pleased?
*134 A. In essence, that would probably be fair.
**372 Q. And that he had complete access inside the
jail and outside the jail at that point?
A. Again, with the custody level a lot to be desired.

1 'I 5
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return to the Montana State Prison.
Q. So he was free to roam around inside the jail,
wasn't he?

Q. And that decision never was pursued, was it?

A. From what I recall, yes, it sounds like he was.

A. No, sir, it was not.

Q. And you were aware of that?

Q. Mr. Bauer was maintained at the Blaine County
jail, correct?

A. At that point in time, yes, I was.
A. That's correct.

Q. And as well, he could leave the jail and go out into
the community, correct?
A. Again, at that point in time, yes.
Q. And you also had concerns because there were
problems with his access to keys, correct?

Q. And the concerns that you had regarding his freedom inside and outside the jail, they formed the basis for this recommendation of yours, didn't they?
A. Initially, yes, they did.

Q. And that would include not just the freedom, but
his access to * 135 keys, correct?

A. That's correct as well.

Q. And that came to your attention during this period
in late March of 1995, correct?
A. All of those issues pretty much stemmed from
Officer Schmidt's contact.

Q. And those concerns prompted a review by you and
Candyce Neubauer and William Pohjola at the
prison, correct?

A. Basic security practices.

Q. And the freedom to go inside the jail and outside
the jail whenever he wanted, that's a fundamental
breakdown in a detention facility, would you
agree?
A. That would probably be a fair assessment, that's
correct.

A. That's correct.

Q. That resulted in the classification summary or a
re-classification document; is that correct?

Q. That inmate is still your responsibility, he's a
Montana State Prison inmate, correct?

A. That's correct.
A. Still an inmate.

Q. Okay. And your recommendation after going
through this was what, Mr. Mahoney?

Q. Okay. You can't change that status, can you, by
transferring him to another facility?
A. No, sir, I cannot.

A. If you're referring to the face sheet?

Q. And you can't also change his court commitment
by transferring him to another facility?

Q. Yes.
A. I wrote at the bottom that it would appear that the
placement does not accurately address public safety and recommend we re-evaluate and potentially

A. No, that certainly exceeds the bounds and authority of the warden.
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Q. Now, the response that was given to these concerns about access to keys and complete freedom
up here in Blaine County, that ended up being
Candyce Neubauer's letter to Sheriff Harrington,
correct?

exposed when brought by force to be locked in a cell
with no freedom of movement on May 25, 1995, for
failing to appear .on a charge of possessing alcohol as
a minor, an offense for which we have since held a
minor cannot be jailed. State v. Bauer, 2001 MT 248,
1\l33, 307 Mont. 105, ·p3, 36 P.3d 892. , 33.

A. 1 believe that's correct.

Q. And that letter indicates that the concern of the
prison is his ability to access the community, correct?
A. 1 think the public safety issue was the theme, that
would be correct.

Q. There's nothing in that letter that addressed or
dealt with the problems with Mr. Bauer's access to
keys at this facility, is there?
A. No, there's nothing in here that states specifically
keys.

Q. And that's a concern that as a prison official you
would agree that you should **373 specifically address with the detention facility?
A. Most definitely it's to be addressed. It just wasn't
placed in there.
Q. And, in fact, it wasn't placed in any written document, was it?
A. To the best of my knowledge, no, it was not.

, 45 However, because of Bauer's freedom of movement, he was able to retrieve jailhouse keys, open the
cell door of a minor, take her to his jail cell and force
her to have intercourse with him without consent.
How, under these circumstances, can it be seriously
argued that the acts of this sexual predator were unforeseeable is mystii'ying.
, 46 The State's response is that because of Candyce
Neubauer's letter, it had a right to assume that Bauer
was under proper supervision and his freedom of
movement had been curtailed. However, Neubauer's
letter was written on April 4, 1995, and as acknowledged by Mahoney, was limited in its criticism to
Bauer's unsupervised presence in the community. It
made no suggestion that his freedom of movement at
the Blaine County jail be restricted or that his access
to Blaine County jail keys be denied.
,47 We have previously held that intervening criminal acts are not always unforeseeable, Estate of
Strever v. Cline (J 996). 278 Mont. 165, 178-79. 924
Pold 666. 673-74, and that sometimes intervening
acts are foreseeable as a matter of law, CusenbalJl v.
Mortensen, 1999 MT 221. '37,296 Mont. 25, '37,
987 P.2d 351. 11 37.
,48 In Mills v. Mather (J 995). 270 Mont. J 88, 198,
890 P.2d 1277, ] 283-84, we noted that:

There are '" situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and guard
against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise
where the actor is under a special responsibility
toward the one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such intentional misconduct.. ..

,43 In other words, the State of Montana admitted
responsibility for the detention and supervision of
Chester Bauer. It admitted that those responsible for
him knew he was not being detained in a secure fashion and had freedom to not only move about the
community but freedom to roam the jail facility and
access to keys at the jail. It admitted that *136 these
breaches of security were a threat to public safety and
it admitted that the only activity it made any effort to
curtail was Bauer's freedom of movement within the
community of Chinook.

(Quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt.
e (1965».

,44 This was the situation to which Wendy Pula was

, 49 The facts in this case present just such a cir-
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cumstance. The State of Montana had a special responsibility to protect Pula and other potential victims from the harm that Bauer inflicted by his intentional conduct.
,50 Furthermore, based on the previously mentioned
admissions by *137 the State, the threat posed by
Bauer was completely foreseeable and the county's
total failure to protect others from him was weIl
known to the State. Therefore, neither Bauer's conduct nor the county's conduct could have served as an
independent intervening cause protecting the State
from liability for its negligence.
, 51 For example, in CusenbalJ) the plaintiff was
injured when an intoxicated patron left the bar, got in
his vehicle and drove the vehicle into the bar. The
defendant bar owner proposed that the district court
instruct the jury that an independent intervening
cause severed the chain of causation. The district
court declined to do so and the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. On appeal, we affIrmed the district
court and stated that:
[TJhis case involves the aIlegation that the chain of
causation was severed by an independent intervening act. However, not all **374 intervening acts
are independent. Those that are foreseeable do not
break the chain of causation. In other words, if one
of the reasons that makes a defendant's act negligent is a greater risk of a particular harmful result
occurring, and that harmful result does occur, the
defendant is generally liable. The test is based on
foreseeability. [Citation omitted.]

In this case, unlike the act of leaving a vehicle unlocked, the act of Mortensen in serving alcohol to
WelIs is the very act which caused the conduct that
resulted in the injury to Cusenbary.The consequences of serving alcohol to a person who is visibly intoxicated are reasonably foreseeable precisely
because of the causal relationship between serving
alcohol and drunken conduct. Wells' drunken conduct was not freakish, bizarre, or unpredictable as
Mortensen asserts. Rather, drunken conduct is the
expected, predictable, and therefore reasonably foreseeable outcome of serving alcohol to a person
who is already intoxicated.

Cusenbarv. 296 Mont. at 32-33,987 P.2d at 355-56.
Accordingly, we conclude that as a matter of law
Wells' conduct of driving a vehicle while intoxicated, through the wall of the Town Tavern, was a
foreseeable intervening cause that did not serve to
supersede or break the causal chain between Mortensen's original negligence and the injury to Cusenbary.
CusenbalJ'. 296 Mont. at 37, 987 P.ld at 358.

,52 Likewise in this case, the lack of proper supervision of Bauer, a known rapist, who was denied parole
on nine occasions because of the known risk that he
presented, was the very omission that alIowed him
*138 to assault the Plaintiff. The consequences of
failing to supervise him and of permitting him to
freely roam the jailhouse were reasonably foreseeable
because they were the exact reason that he had been
imprisoned in the first place.
,53 Finally, it is not correct that the Plaintiff suffered
no prejudice from the District Court's erroneous instructions on intervening cause. The jury was instructed that:
If you find that a negligent act of any other person or
entity caused the injury and damage to plaintiff and
that this negligent act of other persons or entities
occurred after any negligent act of Defendant State
of Montana and that this negligent act ... could not
reasonably be foreseen by Defendant State ofMontana to happen in the natural sequence of events,
the later negligent conduct of this third person or
entity is an independent intervening and superseding cause of the plaintiffs injury and damage.
If you find that the conduct of the third person or
entity was the intervening and superseding cause of
injury and damage to plaintiff, then you must return your verdict for Defendant State of Montana.
Court's Instruction No. 18.

11 '54 ;Supersede lisdefined'in'Webster!s ·Ninth.'New
Colle.giate:Dicfionary "as'~2 :':to~take :the :place, 'room,
or:position'of;3:to displace:in :favor.ofanother:" We
have in fact stated in our opinions that an independent intervening cause cuts off the chain of causation.
Based on either the standard definition of" super-
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sede" or our own case law, it was perfectly consistent
for the jury to conclude that if the county's or Bauer's
conduct was an independent intervening cause, then
the State's negligence was not the cause of Pula's
damages. It does not matter that the jury did not get
to the final question about independent intervening
causes. The Court's instruction was prejudicial and
was the only possible explanation for the jury's finding that the State negligently failed to supervise Bauer but that while he was roaming freely about the jail
with access to keys, that failure to supervise did not
cause his assault on Wendy Pula.

,55 The facts of this case shockingly demonstrate an
avoidable tragedy caused by the failure of state and
local prison officials to protect a young woman from
a known sexual predator who had been placed in the
State's custody because of a series of violent criminal
offenses. Wendy Pula was an underage girl imprisonedbecause she was unable to post bond to secure
her appearance on a charge of being *139 a minor in
possession of **375 alcohol. Had she been convicted
of being a minor in possession of alcohol, she could
not have been imprisoned for that offense. See Bauer,
'33. Yet while she was in prison for her inability to
post bond, she was raped and assaulted by a dangerous predator for whom the State was responsible only
to be told that in spite of the State's negligence, she is
entitled to no damages. This result cannot be explained on any evidentiary or logical basis. I conclude that it can only be attributable to the District
Court's erroneous instruction to the jury that the State
could be relieved of liability by an intervening independent act. Since there was no intervening act which
was "unforeseeable," the defense was inapplicable
and the District Court erred by submitting those instructions to the jury. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and I dissent
from the majority's decision to do otherwise.
Justice JAMES C. NELSON joins in the foregoing
dissent.
Mont.,2002.
Pula v. State
308 Mont. 122, 40 P.3d 364, 2002 MT 9
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Attorney for PlaintiffslPetitioners
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE
STAFFORD, husband and wife,

CASE NO.: 09-2516

PlaintiffslPetitioners,

PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' REPLY
BRIEF ON APPEAL

vs.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,
DefendantslRespondents.

COME NOW PlaintiffslPetitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford (hereafter "Stafford"), by
and through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Reply Briefin
support oftheir appeal.

I. INTRODUCTION.
The parties have briefed the facts giving rise to this dispute. Those facts are largely
undisputed. It is the inferences and legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts that remain
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disputed.
The issue before the Court is not whether the Staffords violated Kootenai County Ordinance
No. 283. Ordinance No. 283 was effective from July 26, 1999 through December 11, 2005. J The
primary issue before the Court is whether the Staffords violated Ordinance No. 374. Kootenai
County specifically charged the Staffords with violating Ordinance No. 374 to the exclusion of any
other ordinance. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0005; 0127-0130.

II. ARGUMENT.
A. If the Staffords Did Eneaee in Citable Conduct (a Point Not Conceded),
Then the Chareeable Offense Was Under Ordinance No. 283.
The County acknowledges that the improvements at issue were completed by July 17,2002.
See BriefofRespondentsatpp. 3-4 (citingARpp. 11-12; 12A-20). Ordinance No. 283 was in effect
at that time, and remained in effect for over three years thereafter (until December 12,2005, the
effective date of Ordinance No. 374).
Ordinance No. 374, the ordinance under which the Staffords were actually charged, was
adopted so as to "take effect and be in full force" on December 12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p.0093.
Since the conduct giving rise to the charge occurred three and one-half years before, as
acknowledged by Kootenai County, Ordinance No. 374 could not be applied retroactively to
criminally punish conduct that occurred prior to the adoption of the ordinance. See,

Q..&,.,

State v.

Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788 (1981).
"The fundamental principle that 'the required criminal law must have existed when
the conduct in issue occurred,' Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (J"d Ed.

On December 12,2005, Ordinance No. 374 took effect, superseding the provisions
of Ordinance No. 283. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093.
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1960), at 58-59, must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from
courts as well as from legislatures .... "

Statev. Byers, 102 Idaho at 166 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.s. 347, 354, 84 S. Ct.
1697, 1702-03 (1964». There is no question that Ordinance No. 374 is criminal in nature in that it
specifically provides that violations may constitute criminal misdemeanors punishable by a
maximum fine of $300 or six (6) months in jailor both.
Accordingly, the following statement urged by the County, in its responsive Brief, is an
incorrect statement of the law:
A violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time the first
disturbance occurred in the summer of 200 1 until Ordinance No.3 74 took effect on
December 12, 2005, and a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day
from that date forward.
See Brief of Respondents at p. 10 (emphasis in original). At most, the County can argue that a
violation occurred under Ordinance No. 283 from the time of the first disturbance in the summer of
2001 until December 12,2005. The County cannot argue that there are any chargeable violations
under Ordinance No. 374 from and after December 12,2005 based upon the clear language of the
ordinance (specifying a prospective effective date), and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post
facto laws. See State v. Byers, supra. Against this background, and based upon the cited authorities,

the Kootenai County Commissioners' finding that the Staffords violated Ordinance No.3 74 should
be reversed.

B. Ordinance No. 337 Has No Effect On These Proceedine-s.
In its Response Brief, Kootenai County cites §§ 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code, adopted

via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337 on August 30, 2004. Section 1-2-3 ofthe Kootenai County
Code provides:
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No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether
such fonner ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty forfeiture or
punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the former
ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or
so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or
claimed arising before the new ordinance takes effect.. ..
See K.c.c. §1-2-3 (appendix A to the Brief of Respondents).
The cited language relied upon by Kootenai County, as contained in § 1-2-3, actually supports
the argument of the Staffords. The language relied upon by Kootenai County supports the
proposition that if the Staffords were to be charged with any offense, it should have been under
Ordinance No. 283 (in effect atthe time ofthe alleged violations) rather than Ordinance No. 374 (the
adoption of which post-dated the commission ofthe alleged violations).
C. The County May Not Use These Proceedin2s to Establish a Violation
of an Act Not Char2ed Under Ordinance No. 283.
The County argues, consistent with the decision of the Commissioners, that this case
presents, in essence, a case of "no harm-no foul" as the cited conduct is alleged to run afoul of both
Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374. To this end, as an implicit means to "end-run" the ex

post facto infinnities arising from the application of Ordinance No. 374, the County argues: "It is
true that from that date forward [December 12,2005], Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or
effect. This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect until
December 12, 2005, however." See Brief of Respondents at p. 12 (emphasis in original). A
Defendant is entitled to notice of the charges against him. The charging authority must prove the
offense charged and the Defendant is not subject to conviction for other offenses even if those
offenses were proven at trial.

See,~,

State v. Washington, 20 Or. App. 350, 531 P.2d 743,

affinned, 273 Or. 829 (1975) (copy attached). The Staffords were never charged with violating
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Ordinance No. 283.

D. Neither Ordinance No. 283 Nor No. 374 Apply to the Facts at Bar.
The Board erred, as a matter oflaw, in its interpretation as to the applicability of Kootenai
County Site Disturbance Ordinances (in whatever variant) to the facts at bar. Each of the ordinances
states that "an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront ... The buffer
shall be a minimum of twenty-five feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water
body.... " See, U, AR, Vol. I, p. 0057-58.
The ordinances in turn each define an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" as:

An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including, but not
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and
storm water facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state.
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0049 (emphasis added).
The Board was presented with unrebutted evidence that the Stafford property was developed
within twenty-five feet of the high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene before any activity was
undertaken thereon by the Staffords. In other words, the property, prior to any action giving rise to
the disputes at issue, was "disturbed" by definition. There was no "undisturbed natural vegetation
buffer" to maintain. The ordinances specifically require the maintenance of previously undisturbed
natural vegetation buffers and, according to their clear terms, do not apply where the area in question
has already been disturbed through development activity or logging. In this instance, there is no
"natural" area to preserve.

E. The Staffords Incorporate the Remainin~ Ar~uments
Previously Contained in Their Openin~ Brief on Appeal.
As to the definition of "supercede," and the applicability of the law of estoppel to these
particular facts, the authorities and arguments cited by Kootenai County, in its Respondents' Brief,
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do not change or alter the conclusions previously advanced with respect to those issues by the
Staffords. The Staffords reincorporate the arguments previously contained in their Opening Brief.

III. CONCLUSION.
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants Douglas and Michelle
Stafford respectfully request that the Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners, find that, as a matter oflaw, their has been no violation of Ordinance No.
374 shown (the same Ordinance being inapp licable to the facts at bar), and enter an order remanding
the matter with instructions that the violation be dismissed. The Staffords also request an award of
reasonable attomeyfees and costs as incurred herein pursuant to Idaho law, including I.e. §§ 12-117
and 12-121.
DATED this

A/A
--fh.-

day of November, 2009.

/--ers Stafford

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
following by facsimile and first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows, this _ __
day of November, 2009:
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Fax: 446-1621
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H
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Billy Walker WASHINGTON, Appellant.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 17,1975.
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Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court.
Multnomah County, Richard J. Burke, J., of firstdegree burglary, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schwab, C.J., held that where neither the
statutory definition of first-degree burglary nor the
indictment put defendant on notice that he might be
convicted of the crime of theft, defendant was not
entitled to a jury charge defining the elements of
theft, notwithstanding defendant's contention that
evidence offered at trial might support theft conviction.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
(1] Criminal Law 110 ~795(4)

110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
llOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
llOk795 Grade or Degree of Offense; Included Offenses
llOk795(4) k. Effect of Doubt as to
Grade or Degree. Most Cited Cases
Rule that trial court should instruct on other offenses when such instruction is supported by evidence does not mean that trial court can instruct on
any offenses arguably committed by defendant that
are disclosed by evidence. ORS 136.460, 136.465.
[2] Indictment and Information 210 C==:>189(7)

210 Indictment and Information
210XIII Included Offenses
21 Ok 189 Lesser Grade or Degree of Offense
Charged
21Ok189(7) k. Degrees of Burglary. Most
Cited Cases
Second-degree burglary is always necessarily included offense in charge of first-degree burglary.
ORS 164.215, 164.225.
[3] Indictment and Information 210 C==:>191(.5)
210 Indictment and Information
210XIII Included Offenses
21Ok191 Different Offense Included in Offense Charged
21OkI91(.5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 2IOk191)
When determining when offense is lesser included,
court's consideration should be limited to statutory
definition of offenses and indictment in particular
case.ORS 136.460, 136.465 .
[4] Larceny 234 €;::;:>70(3)
234 Larceny
234II Prosecution and Punishment
234II(C) Trial and Review
234k69 Instructions
234k70 In General
234k70(3) k. Applicability to Issues
and Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Where neither burglary statute nor indictment for
first-degree burglary put defendant on notice that
he might be convicted of crime of theft, defendant
was not entitled to jury instruction defining elements of theft, notwithstanding contention that
evidence offered at trial might support theft conviction.ORS 136.460, 136.465, 164.225.
*351 **743 J. Marvin Kuhn, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem .
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jury that it could 'also consider the lesser included
offense of Theft in the Second Degree by Receiving.' The trial court did not do so, instructing only
on the elements of the crime charged-first degree
burglary. The jury found defendant guilty, and he
appeals from the resulting judgment.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and FOLEY and FORT, JJ.
SCHWAB, Chief Judge.
The broad issue in this case concerns the method
whereby trial courts should determine whether they
can instruct a jury on the elements of a crime other
than that charged in an indictment. The narrow issue is whether, as defendant claims, the trial court
could and should have instructed on the elements of
theft at the conclusion of his burglary trial.
Defendant was charged with first degree burglary.
ORS 164.225. There was evidence that during the
afternoon of February 14, 1974 defendant stole
house keys from Robert Redfern; that an hour or so
later Redfern's daughter, Judith DeVine, returned to
the family home and found the door ajar; that DeVine entered the house and was attacked by a man;
and that her purse was taken at that time. Later that
**744 evening police stopped defendant's car because it matched the description-bronze Pontiac
with Iowa license plates-of a car DeVine had seen
idling in front of *352 her house just before she
entered an was attacked. The officers found a purse
under the seat. De Vine later identified the purse
and its contents as her property.
Defendant told police the following story of the
day's events. Defendant drove Redfern and Nathaniel Johnson to Redfern's place of employment to
obtain money to buy drinks . Defendant remained in
the car while Redfern and Johnson went in. Johnson
returned alone claiming Redfern had decided to
stay. Johnson then asked defendant to drove to what
proved to be Redfern's home address, which defendant did. Johnson entered the house and returned
carrying a purse. Johnson later left the purse in the
car, asking defendant to dispose of it.

Defendant argues that the evidence offered at trialsuch as DeVine's inability to identify him as her assailant and defendant's story about receiving the
purse from Johnson-if believed by the jury would
have led it to reasonably conclude that defendant
committed theft by receiving the purse from Johnson but did not enter the burglarized residence and,
therefore, did not commit burglary. Defendant's argument thus focuses only on the evidence offered at
trial, rather than the statutory definitions of the elements of the crimes in question or the specifics of
the indictment*353 in this case. This argument confuses two analytically distinct questions: (I) when
Should a trial court instruct on offenses, other than
that charged in an indictment; and (II) what offenses, other than that charged, Can a trial court describe to the jury.

[1] State v. Williams, 99 Or.Adv.Sh. 1934, 526
P.2d 1384 (1974), and State v. Atkins, 99
Or.Adv.Sh. 1333,525 P.2d 1018 (1974), hold that a
trial court should instruct on other offenses when
such instruction is supported by the evidence.
However, in both Williams and Atkins it was conceded that the requested instruction regarding another offense Could properly have been given; the
only question was whether it Should have been given based on the evidence. It would thus be a mistake to read Williams and Atkins, as defendant apparently does, for the proposition that a trial court
can instruct on any offenses arguably committed by
the defendant that are disclosed by the evidence.
The facts of State v. Hammang, Or.App., 99
Adv.Sh. 2102, 527 P.2d 137, Sup.Ct. review allowed (1974) illustrate our point. In that case there

Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the
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was evidence that defendant had stolen some guns
and later participated in a homicide. If he had been
prosecuted only for murder, and evidence about
having stolen guns had been admitted in the murder
trial, it does not necessarily follow that the court
could instruct the jury on the elements of theft,
even though that offense may have been disclosed
by the evidence.

II
The authority of a court to instruct a jury on the elements of crimes other than charged in an indictment
usually depends upon lesser-included- and necessarily-included-offense*354 analysis. There are two
relevant statutes:
'Upon a charge for a crime consisting of different
degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty
of the degree charged in the accusatory instrument
and guilty of any degree inferior thereto or of an attempt to commit the crime or any such inferior degree thereof.' ORS 136.460.
'In all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of
any crime the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged in the accusatory**745 instrument or of an attempt to commit such crime.' ORS 136.465.
The real problem in this case boils down to determining what can be considered in deciding whether
an offense is lesser included or necessarily included
in that charged: the statutes defining the offenses
and/or the indictment and/or the evidence at trial.
It has been pointed out that there is a technical distinction between 'lesser included' and 'necessarily
included' offenses, but that courts generally use
these terms interchangeably. Olais-Castro v.
United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 11 A.L.R.Fed. 165
(9th Cir. 1969) . Thus, it has been suggested that
' necessarily-included' offense 'denotes a relationship which always exists between two offense categories * * * regardless of the facts of a particular
case,' while what is a 'lesser-included ' offense

'depends upon particular facts .' 8 Moore's Federal
Practice, s 31.03 (2d ed. 1969).
[2] Under the above analysis, in order to determine
if an offense is ' necessarily included,' a court
should limit itself to an analysis of the relationship
between the two offense categories, i.e., the statutory definitions of the offenses. For example, first
degree burglary, ORS 164.225, is defined as consisting of the acts *355 that constitute second degree burglary, ORS 164.215, plus additional aggravating acts. Thus, second degree burglary is, under the statutes, always a necessarily included offense in a charge of first degree burglary. As another example, the various degrees of robbery, ORS
164.395 to 164.415, would appear to be combinations of the crime of theft, ORS 164.045, 164.055,
and the various degrees of assault and related offenses,ORS 163.165 to 163.190. Thus, in a robbery
case both theft and some degree of assault might
well always be, under the statutes, necessarily included offenses.
[3J Continuing the above analysis, determining
whether an offense is 'lesser included' presents alternative possible approaches. It has been broadly
stated that this can depend on 'particular facts,' 8
Moore's Federal Practice, supra, but does this mean
that the indictment sets the parameters of these offenses which are lesser included, as argued by the
state, or that just the evidence can make an offense
lesser included, as implicitly argued by defendant?
We believe the better rule is, and hold, that when
determining whether an offense is lesser included
the court's consideration should be limited to the
statutory definition of the offenses and the indictment in the particular case. Our conclusion rests
primarily on the problem of notice to a criminal defendant of the charges he must be prepared to
meet. Reading the relevant statutes furnishes notice
of charges that are included. Reading the relevant
statutes together with the indictment furni shes notice of the charges that are included in the particular
case. Permitting instructions on other offenses,
even if there is evidence at trial that they were com-

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

128

Page 5 of5

531 P.2d 743
20 Or.App. 350,531 P.2d 743
(Cite as: 20 Or.App. 350, 531 P.2d 743)
mitted, runs the risk that a criminal defendant *356
could rightfully complain that he stands convicted
of an offense he was never notified he might have
to defend against. As the court put it in Kelly v.
United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 370 F.2d
227,229 (1966), cert. denied 388 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct.
2127,18 L.Ed.2d 1355 (1967):

'* * *

(Defendant's) right to invoke (the lesser included offense or necessarily included offense doctrines) does not extend beyond the right of the prosecutor. The right of the prosecutor is limited to the
offense of which defendant has been given notice
by the indictment and the defendant is not suQiect
to conviction for other offenses because of the
nature of the proof. What is controlling is the offense char ed in the indictment, not the offense esta Iished by the trial proo , wether it is t e pro~ec
utOr or defendant who is seeking extensIOn froJ!! · tbe
offense charged to another offense as 'necesSilrily
included."

Page 4

*357 Nothing in this indictment puts defendant on
notic.e that he might be convicted of the crime of
theft. Cf., State v. Ryan, 15 Or. 572, 16 P. 417
(1888).
Affirmed.
Or.App. 1975.
State v. Washington
20 Or.App. 350,531 P.2d 743
END OF DOCUMENT

[4] Turning to the facts at bar, our holding compels
the conclusion that the trial court could not have instructed the jury on the elements of theft at the conclusion**746 of defendant's burglary trial. Under
the statutes, the gravamen of burglary is to enter or
remain unlawfully in a building with the intent to
commit a crime therein. ORS 164.215; 164.225.
Nothing in the statutes puts defendant on notice he
might be found guilty of theft. The indictment in
this case reads:
,* * *
The said defendant, on or about February 14, 1974,
in the County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did
knowingly and unlawfully enter a building, to-wit:
a dwelling, located at 5526 Northeast 38th, Portland, in the County and State aforesaid, with the intent to commit the crime of theft therein, contrary
to the Statutes in such cases made and provided,
and against the peace and dignity of the State of .
Oregon . .

'* * * '
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD,

}
}
)
)

Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

)
}
}

KOOTENAI COUNTY, et al.
Respondent/Defendant/Respondent.

Case No.

CV 2009 2516

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON APPEAL

)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND.
This is an administrative review of a decision by the respondent Kootenai County
Board of County Commissioners (Board) pursuant to the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act, I.C. § 67-5201, et seq. Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford
(Staffords) appeal to this Court from a decision of the Board, which upheld the
decisions of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (Planning
Department) (R. Vol. III, p. 615-624), which upheld the decision of the Kootenai County
Hearing Examiner, which found Staffords in violation of Kootenai County Ordinance No;
374, the "Site Disturbance Ordinance." R. Vol. III, pp. 468-474.
The Staffords made improvements in the 25-foot buffer area between their
property and the st)ore of Lake Coeur d'Alene. The Ordinance reads:
For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or
Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shaH be.
retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not exceed
4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The
buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope or distance from the high
water mark of the water body ...
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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On August 29,2007, the Planning Department issued a Notice of Violation,
alleging Staffords violated Ordinance No. 374 by causing a site disturbance within the
25-foot setback. R. Vol. I, p. 5. On March 19, 2008, the Planning Department again
issued a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation (R. Vol. I, p. 136), which
Staffords timely appealed on March 21,2008. Following the October 2,2008, hearing,
the Hearing Examiner found Staffords had violated Ordinance No. 374. R. Vol. III, pp.
468-474. Staffords then appealed to the Board. On February 12,2009, the Board held
a hearing on Staffords' appeal and issued a written Order of Decision on March 19,
2009. The Order required, inter alia, a design professional to prepare a remediation
plan for the no-disturbance zone; the Order was later amended on April 16,2009,
changing the timeline for compliance. Staffords timely filed a Petition for Judicial
Review on March 27, 2009, and a First Amended Petition for judicial Review on April
24,2009.
Staffords raise three issues on appeal:
1. Whether the Board's Order denying their appeal was erroneous as a
matter of law?
2. Whether the Board's Order denying their appeal was arbitrary,
capricious, and abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record?
3. Whether the County should be estopped from citing Staffords for a
violation of Ordinance No. 374?

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The standard governing judicial review in a case involving the Local Land Use
Planning Act (LLUPA) provides this Court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 675279(1). Rather, this Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on
the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long
as the determinations are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record.
Fischerv. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352,109 P.3d 1091,1094 (2005).
A county zoning board is treated as an administrative agency for the purposes
of judicial review. Chisholm v. Twin Falls, 139 Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003). "As
administrative bodies having expertise in the zoning problems of their jurisdiction, their
actions are presumptively valid." Gordon Paving Co. v. Blaine Co. Bd. Of Comm'r., 98
Idaho 730,731,572 P.2d 164, 165 (1977). The reviewing court must Iimitits review to
the factual record compiled in proceedings before the zoning board. Bone v. City of
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844,693 P.2d 1046 (1984). The party that attacks a Board's
finding must illustrate that the Board erred pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279(3). A Board's
findings may not: (1) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (2) violate statutory or
constitutional provisions; (3) be made upon unlawful procedure; (4) not be supported by
substantial evidence in the record; or (5) be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion; and a substantial right must have been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County
Bd. of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 587 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS.
A. The Board's Decision Sustaining the Violation of Ordinance No. 374
Was Not Erroneous as a Matter of Law.
Staffords argue the adoption of Ordinance No. 374 post-dated the conduct that
gave rise to the violation charged because there is no dispute that the Staffords' actions
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were performed in 2001, while Ordinance No. 374 came into effect on December 12,
2005. The Staffords go on to argue Ordinance No. 283, which had been in effect at the
time of Staffords' actions and contains similar language to Ordinance No. 374, is
irrelevant to these proceedings because Staffords were not charged under Ordinance
No. 283, and Ordinance No. 283 no longer exists as the superseding of Ordinance No.
283 means it was '''obliterated,' 'annulled,' and 'rendered of no force and effect'" by
adoption of Ordinance No. 374. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 12-13.
Staffords' final argument in this regard is that the Board's determination in this matter
was contrary to the language of Ordinance No. 374 because there is no evidence the
acts of the Staffords caused significant adverse effects to property or water and the
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer promoted by Ordinance No. 374 was previously
logged, developed and used prior to Staffords' purchase in 1999. Id.
In response, the Board notes the language of Ordinance Nos. 374 and 283 are
identical to one another and to their predecessor, Ordinance No. 251, which was
adopted on October 15,1996, and was in effect until Ordinance No. 283 was adopted
on July 21, 1999, replacing it. Brief of Respondents, pp. 8-9. The Board argues
Staffords caused site disturbances, and work to be performed, in the no-disturbance
zone beginning in the summer of 2001 and the landscaping performed by Staffords
"within the no-disturbance zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance
Ordinance in effect at any given time." Id., pp. 9-10. (emphasis in original).
The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales,
sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they
continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of
however aesthetically pleasing these features may be. Therefore, it was
perfectly lawful and appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of
this provision of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect,
Ordinance No. 374.

133
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Id., p. 10. (emphasis in original). Because of the ongoing nature of the violation, the
Board claims any argument regarding Ordinance No. 374 superseding Ordinance No.
283 (and thereby rendering Ordinance No. 283 obliterated or annulled) is moot. Id. In
this regard, the Board cites the saving clause of the Kootenai County Code, at § 1-2-3,
which states in relevant part:
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former
ordinance ... as to any offense committed against such former
ordinance ... or in any way whatever to affect such offense or act so
committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred
or any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance takes
effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform to the
ordinance in force at the time of such proceeding, so far as practicable.
Kootenai County Code, § 1-2-3, adopted via enactment of Kootenai County Ordinance
No. 337. Additionally, the Board argues foreign case law has defined "supersede" to
mean ''to take the place, room, or position of, ... to displace in favor of another" and
while Ordinance No. 283 had no force and effect beyond December 12, 2005, its being
superseded by Ordinance No. 374 nevertheless cannot turn unlawful conduct at the
time of occurrence into lawful conduct. Brief of Respondents, p. 12, citing Pula v.
State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2002). Finally, as to Staffords' argument the Board's
determination is contrary to the language of Ordinance No. 374, the Board argues the
purpose of the Ordinance (protecting property, surface water and ground water against
significant adverse effects) does not require a finding of actual significant adverse
effects to cite a landowner for violation of the requirement to maintain a 25-foot
undisturbed vegetation buffer from the ordinary high water mark. Id., p. 13. The Board
argues it acted properly in recognizing that remediation of the site disturbance was
necessary (due to watering/fertilizing the lawn in the buffer area, and erosion of sand
placed in the buffer area) regardless of the aesthetically pleasing features of Staffords'
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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additions. Id., pp. 13-14.
Preliminarily, a public body may not permit a use that is prohibited by a land use
ordinance. City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,846,136 P.3d 310,317
(2006); County of Ada, Board of County Com'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 632, 533 P.2d

1199,1201 (1975) (county commissioners may not allow a use that would violate a
zoning ordinance); Hubbard v. Canyon County Com'rs, 106 Idaho 436,437,680 P.2d
537,538 (1984) (county commissioners may not permit an implied variance violative of
land use ordinances); City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693
P.2d 1108,1111 (Ct.App. 1984) (a variance request contemplates no modification of
the zoning ordinance). As such, the Board has no authority to deviate from the Site
Disturbance Ordinance. Ordinance No. 251, No. 283, and No. 374 are identical as to
Section 8(B) of each of those iterations. Section 8(B) of each of those Ordinances
reads:
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer.
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope or distance from the
high water mark of the water body.
R. pp. 57-58; Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 13; R. p. 89. Idaho
Courts have followed the reasoning of jurisdictions which hold that where an applicant
has complied with all existing requirements, a public official must issue a building
permit. Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 600-601, 448 P .2d 209,
214-15 (1968) (discussing State ex rei. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492,
275 P.2d 899 (1954); Sgromolo v. City of Asbury Park, 134 N.J.L. 195, 46 A.2d 661
(1946». An occupancy permit, however, is likely a matter of discretion. Although no
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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Idaho case law directly on point exists, foreign jurisdictions consistently find issuance of
a certificate of occupancy as discretionary. See Assoko v. City of New York, 539
F.Supp.2d 728, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("If a building does not conform to the
requirements for a Certificate, the Commissioner has no discretion to issue one.");
Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F.Supp2d 34, 62 (D.Conn., 2006) (Finding no question of

material fact regarding the fundamentally discretionary nature of issuance of a permit or
license); Silver v. Franklin Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1034
(6 th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff had not established a substantive due process violation
because the board had discretion to grant him a permit even if plaintiff complied with
"minimum, mandatory requirements; therefore, plaintiff had no "justifiable expectation"
or "legitimate claim of entitlement".)
Here, Staffords' initial application for building permit was issued in July 1999.
A.R. Vol. I, p. 28. Staffords' initial certificate of occupancy was granted on March 23,

2000. Id., pp. 39-40. In 2001, Staffords "cleaned up" their property within the 25 foot
setback zone; this included re-greening, moving rocks, adding sand, and adding a
barbeque pit. Petitioners' Opening brief on Appeal, p. 7. In August of 2005, Staffords
applied for another building permit for an addition to their home; the permit was
approved in October 2005. R. Vol. I, p. 67. In August of 2007, Staffords requested a
certificate of occupancy on the addition and the request was denied by letter dated
January 15, 2008. Id., pp. 113-114. Staffords argue the determination that they
violated Ordinance No. 374, giving rise to the denial of the certificate of occupancy, was
improper because the violation was based on "improvements that the Department
acknowledges were completed in July 2001" and at that time, Ordinance No. 283 was in
effect, not Ordinance No. 374. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 8.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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Again, issuance of a certificate of occupancy is a matter of discretion.
Additionally, Staffords complaint of being cited for violation of an ordinance not yet in
effect at the time of their actions, results in no prejudice to Staffords because
Ordinance No. 374 does not differ in any way from Ordinance No. 283. The language
and purpose of each consecutive site disturbance ordinance was identical. Staffords
state, "ft]he charging document which carries criminal penalties, was based solely upon
Ordinance No. 374." Id., p. 12.
An ex post facto analysis is inappropriate here. Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 16 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit
ex post facto laws. The clauses prevent enactment of "any statute which punishes as a
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act
was committed ... " Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42,110 S.Ct. 2715, 2716-17
(1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,169-70,46 S.Ct. 68, 70 (1925»;
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, _ , 207 P.3d 988, 993
(2009). (italics added).
First of all, the italicized portion demonstrates why this is not an ex post facto
application. Staffords' actions took place in 2001. At that time Ordinance No. 283 was
in effect. While Staffords were accused of violating and determined to have violated
Ordinance No. 374 (the successor ordinance to Ordinance No. 283), in no way does
that punish Staffords for acts previously committed, "which were innocent when done",
because Ordinance No. 283 punished the same behavior prior to 2005.
Second, there is also no evidence before the Court that Ordinance No. 374
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL
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makes "more burdensome the punishment for the crime [Staffords' violation]" as
outlined in Col/ins, because even though the ordinance number changed, the potential
punishment has always remained the same.
Third, there is no evidence before the Court that the newer ordinance "deprives
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when
the act was committed", as set forth in Collins. Staffords have simply not identified how
they were deprived of any defense available according to law at the time their acts were
committed.
Fourth, the ex post facto prohibition applies only to criminal or penal, not civil,
actions. Wheeler, 147 Idaho 257, _ , 207 P.3d 988, 993. Staffords argue:
The County cannot argue that there are any chargeable violations under
Ordinance No. 374 from and after December 12, 2005 based upon the
clear language of the ordinance (specifying a prospective effective date),
and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
Petitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal, p. 3. Staffords have not set forth support for their
contention the Kootenai County's site disturbance ordinance is criminal or penal, nor
have they established that, to the extent the ordinance was intended to be civil, it is
nonetheless so punitive as to negate that intention. See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248-49,100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641-42 (1980). Staffords state, "[t)here is no question that
Ordinance No. 374 is criminal in nature in that it specifically provides that violations may
constitute criminal misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine of $300 or six (6)
months in jail or both." Petitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal, p. 3. (emphasis added).
First of all, Staffords have never been charged criminally, not that such fact makes or
does not make such Ordinance criminal in nature. Second, "Violations of this
Ordinance may be considered a criminal misdemeanor... " Ordinance No. 374, Section
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13; R. p. 93. The use of the word "may" makes it discretionary. Most crimes make a
combination of certain facts (eg., driving and being in control of a vehicle on a public
highway) a crime. There is nothing discretionary about the following language of I.C. §

18-8004: "It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or
any other intoxicating substances .....to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or
private property open to the public." (emphasis added). Third, and most importantly, it
is unlikely that the Kootenai County Ordinance(s) at issue are criminal and/or penal in
nature, as a remediation plan was proposed to bring the Staffords' property within the
site disturbance ordinance requirements. See R. Vol. I, pp. 102-104, 111-114.
Staffords focus much of their argument on the fact that their actions were taken
back in 2001. This Court is convinced that the Ordinance covers the "status" of
property, not just the "actions" taken that placed that property out of compliance with
the Ordinance. This interpretation, that the Ordinance covers the status of property, is
indicated by phrases such as: "... an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be

retained at the waterfront", and ..... shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer."
Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(8); R. p. 89. (italics added). This interpretation that the
Ordinance covers the status of property (not simply the actions taken by the landowner
that created that status), is made clear by the penalties section of the Ordinance. The
penalties for violation of Ordinance No. 374 are as follows:
Violations of this Ordinance may be considered a criminal misdemeanor
and shall be punishable by a maximum fine of three hundred dollars
($300.00) or six (6) months in jail or both. Each day of violation shall
constitute a separate offense. The county may also take civil action to
compel performance and completion of, or maintenance of, improvements
instal/ed pursuant to this chapter.
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Ordinance No. 374, Section 13; R. p. 93. (emphasis added). The plain language of
the penalties section of the ordinance supports the Board's statement that:
The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales,
sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they
continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of
however aesthetically pleasing these features may be.
Brief of Respondents, p. 10. Because each day of violation constitutes a separate
offense, and because the County cannot permit Staffords to engage in a use prohibited
by an ordinance, see supra, the Staffords' violation of the site-disturbance ordinance
was properly charged under Ordinance No. 374, despite Staffords' acts having violated
the Ordinance before December 2005, at a time when Ordinance No. 283 was in effect.
Staffords' final argument that the Board's determination is contrary to the
language of Ordinance No. 374 also fails. Staffords' argument is in two parts.
First, Staffords argue: "The stated purpose of Ordinance No. 374 is "to protect
property, surface water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from
excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil erosion, sedimentation, and storm
water run-off .. .' See AR, Vol. 1, p. 0078." Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 14.
Staffords argue there was no showing of "significant adverse effects" due to the
placement of a barbeque pit, lawn sand and basalt rocks . . Petitioners' Opening Brief on
Appeal, p. 14. Staffords appear to claim that since there has been no showing of
"significant adverse effects" (the stated purpose of the ordinance), there can be no
violation of Ordinance No. 374. If the stated purpose of I.C. § 18-8004 is to reduce
injury and death on the highway caused by drunk drivers, and the statute accomplishes
that stated purpose by making it illegal to drive while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, the prosecuting attorney does not need to prove that the impaired driver would
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have caused death or injury on the highway. The prosecutor need only prove that the
person was driving or in control of a vehicle on a highway while impaired. It is the
status that is the violation of the law, not the stated purpose that is the violation of the
law. In the present case, the violation is in not having " ... an undisturbed natural
vegetation buffer. ..retained at the waterfront." Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(8): R. p.
89. The violation charged is not a violation of the "Purpose" section of that Ordinance,
Section 3, which reads: "The purpose of this Ordinance shall be to protect property,
surface water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from excavation,
filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil erosion, sedimentation, and stormwater runoff
and to provide maximum safety in the development and design of building sites, roads,
and other service amenities."
Second , Staffords argue that logging and development which took place prior to
Staffords' purchase of the property results in there not having been an "undisturbed
natural vegetation buffer" in place when Staffords bought the property in 1999.
Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 14-15. Staffords' argument is that since the
25-foot setback zone had already been logged, developed and used before Staffords
bought the property in 1999, and " ... since the purpose of leaving an undisturbed natural
vegetation buffer is to preclude development activity, then that purpose is irrelevant
when development activity has already occurred." Id. Essentially, Staffords argue they
can't have violated the Ordinance by disturbing the natural vegetation buffer (by
Staffords planting grass, placing sand and rocks, building a barbecue pit), because
some prior owner before them had disturbed the natural vegetation buffer in different
ways (by logging and placing slash in this strip). That argument is simply not
supportable. Ordinance No. 374, Section 4, specifically defines "Undisturbed Natural
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Vegetation Buffer" as:
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur
including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads,
structures or surface and storm water facilities. Buffer areas shall be left
in their natural state.
Given the "or" language used in the definition, it appears the ordiriance, which requires
"an undisturbed vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront", prohibits
development activity from occurring prospectively as well as retroactively. Thus, again,
the Board is correct in noting a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred each day
forward from the ordinance's enaction in December 2005. To the extent -a prior owner
engaged in logging and other development activities on that buffer zone, the ordinance
nonetheless prohibits development activity which "will occur" and Staffords' actions
beginning in 2001 amounts to activity which occurred regardless of the previous
owners' development activity having already occurred before their purchase of the
property. One also needs to look at where the phrase "natural vegetation buffer" is
used, and that is in Section 8(B) of these ordinances, specifically Ordinance No. 374.
Under that section, for waterfront lots, "... an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall
be retained at the waterfront." Under this Ordinance, the landowner has a duty to retain
twenty-five feet of "undisturbed natural vegetation". There is no possible way to
construe that Ordinance to mean that if some prior landowner has previously come in
and "disturbed" the area, that fact means all bets are off and the current landowner can
disregard the Ordinance and "disturb" that area even more, or "disturb" it in a different
way. Such an interpretation is neither supported by any rule of statutory construction,
nor by logic.

/
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B. The Board's Decision Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious, an Abuse of
Discretion, or Unsupported by Substantial Evidence in the Record.
Staffords argue only, "the Board's application of the Ordinance [No. 374] to the
facts at bar was arbitrary, capricious, and to the extent necessary, constituted an abuse
of discretion" for the reasons Staffords articulated in their argument above. Petitioners'
Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 15. In response, the Board states:
... [T]he undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation of the
no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently
exists on the Stafford property. Therefore, the Board's decision that the
Department properly issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site
Disturbance Ordinance was based on substantial evidence in the record
as a whole.
Brief of Respondent, p. 15.
As noted by the Board, even where there is conflicting evidence before an
agency, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court as long
as they are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Lane Ranch

Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584.590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007).
SUbstantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36,
43. 981 P.2d 1146. 1153 (1999). In the instant case, the Board made nine findings of
fact. A.R. Vol. III, pp. 619-20. The Board discussed the first and second applications
for building permits and certificates of occupancy and the presence of an unpermitted
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand in the no-disturbance zone. Id.
There is no support for the contention that the evidence considered by the Board was
not relevant evidence a reasonable mind may accept to support the conclusion
reached. Lamar Corp., 133 Idaho 36,43. 981 P.2d1146, 1153. And even Staffords do
not make the claim that they engaged in no development within the twenty-five-foot
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setback area. Staffords readily admit they cleaned-up their property, including areas
within the setback, and added sand, re-greened, and added a barbecue pit. Petitioners'
Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 7. It follows that the Board did not act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner or abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. And rather than
merely affirming the Notice of Violation, the Board ordered Staffords "shall submit and
receive approval for a Site Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees."
A.R. Vol. III, p. 623. The record does not indicate any attempt by the County to enforce
the penalties Staffords identify as criminal for the violation at issue.

C. The County Should Not Be Estopped from Citing Staffords for a
Violation of Ordinance No. 374.
Staffords' final argument is that the County be estopped, under the unique facts
of this case, from charging Staffords with a violation of an Ordinance which post-dates
the offenses charged. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 16-17. Staffords admit
the doctrine of estoppel generally does not apply to governmental agencies, but argue
"the people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same rules of
honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private citizen, and should no more be
allowed to lull a citizen to repose and confidence in what would otherwise be false and
erroneous position than should a private citizen." Id., p. 15, citing Murtaugh Highway

Dist. V. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). The Board cites
Idaho case law setting forth the "extraordinary circumstances" rule regarding estoppel
against governmental entities. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243,506 P.2d 470

(1973); Sprenger, Grubb & assoc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741
(1995); Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,198, 207 P.3d 169 (2009).
As in Terrazas, Staffords here do not explicitly identify whether the doctrine of
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equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel is applicable. Equitable estoppel elements are: (1)
a false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not know or could not have known; (3) the false representation being made
with the intent that it be relied-upon; and (4) actual reliance and action on the
representation or concealment to the party's detriment. Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho
323,325,757 P.2d 186, 188 (1987). Quasi-estoppel, on the other hand, applies where:
(1) the offending party took a position different than their original position; and (2) either
(a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other
party or (b) the other party was induced to change positions or (c) it would be
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from
one he or she already derived a benefit from or acquiesced in. Allen v. Reynolds, 145
Idaho 807, 812,186 P.3d 663,668 (2008). Here, there is no allegation of any false
representation or concealment of a material fact. Thus, it is likely Staffords are invoking
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. As in Terrazas, it cannot be said the Board here took
inconsistent positions; determination that Staffords' actions took place in the twenty-five
foot setback zone has been the only official position taken and there is no evidence
Staffords were induced to change their position. "If this Court were to apply the
doctrine of estoppel in the instant case, then all future boards of commissioners in
similar circumstances would be estopped from disagreeing with the opinions of a staff
member simply because a landowner expended money in reliance on these opinions."
Terrazas, 147 Idaho 193, _ , 207 P.3d 169, 177. (Discussing statutory authority to

approve or deny subdivision applications). And, as stated above, the Board had no
authority to permit Staffords to engage in an action prohibited by ordinance. See City of
Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,846,136 P.3d 310,317; County of Ada,
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Board of County Com'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 632, 533 P.2d 1199, 1201; Hubbard
v. Canyon County Com'rs, 106 Idaho 436,437,680 P.2d 537, 538; City of Burley v.
McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,909,693 P.2d 1108, 1111. There is no evidence

of any advantage inuring to the County as a result of its affirming a Notice of Violation.
Therefore, it cannot be said the County maintained an inconsistent position from one it
already derived a benefit from. Nor was there any acquiescence in Staffords' second
building permit of request for certificate of occupancy as the Board states, "no plans
[were] shown for any development of activity within the no-disturbance zone." AR. Vol.
III, p. 619. Under these facts, Staffords have not shown the exigent circumstances
(which the parties in Harrell, Spenger, Grubb &Assoc., and Terrazas were all also
unable to demonstrate) and the application of estoppel is, likewise, not warranted here.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
For the reasons stated above, the Board's decision must be affirmed.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the March 19,2009, Findings of Fact, Applicable
Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision of the Board (Petition for
Judicial Review, p. 6, ~ 27; First Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. 6,

1f 26,

Exhibit A to Petition for Judicial Review; Exhibit A to First Amended Petition for Judicial
Review), rejecting Stafford's appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance 374 (R.
VoL III, pp. 615-624) is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the April 16,2009, Amended Findings of Fact,
Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision of the Board
(First Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. 6,

1f 26, Exhibit B), rejecting Stafford's

Appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance 374 (R. Vol. III, p. 628-636) is also
AFFIRMED.
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Entered this 2 day of December, 2009.
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1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
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Fax: (208) 667-0500
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Attorney for PlaintiffslPetitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE
STAFFORD, husband and wife,

CASE NO.: 09-2516

PlaintiffslPetitioners,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.

FEE CATEGORY: L
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R.
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities,

FEE: $101

Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho, acting through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMERR. "RICK" CURRlE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD
TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in their official capacities,

AND TO:

YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, SCOTT W. REED.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that:
1.

The above-named Appellants, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, appeal against the
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above-named Respondents, Kootenai County, a political subdivision of the State ofldaho, acting
through the Kootenai Board of Commissioners; and Elmer R. "Rick" Currie, Rich Piazza, and Todd
Tondee, Commissioners, in their official capacities, from the following order and judgment entered
in Kootenai County Case No. CV-09-2516 by the District Court, the Honorable John T. Mitchell
presiding: Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal (entered December 2, 2009).
2.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rule II(a)(2).
3.

The issues on appeal shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a)

Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order
denying the Staffords' appeal was erroneous as a matter of law?

(b)

Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order
denying the Staffords' appeal was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse
of discretion?

(c)

Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order
denying the Staffords' appeal was unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole?

(d)

Whether Kootenai County should be estopped from citing Staffords
for a violation of Ordinance No. 374?

(e)

Whether the District Court erred in affirming the March 19, 2009 and
April 16, 2009 Findings and Conclusions of the Kootenai County
Commissioners?

4.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No.

5.

The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included under IAR 28:
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NUMBER

DOCUMENT TITLE

FILEDIENTERED

1

Petition for Judicial Review

March 27, 2009

2

First Amended Petition for Review

Apri127,2009

3

Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal

December 2, 2009

6.

Appellants Stafford also request that, since this proceeding represents an appeal from

an administrative decision for the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (pursuant to the Local
Land Use Planning Act, IC. §67-6521 and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Ie. §§67-5270
through 67-5277), that the administrative record of proceedings before the County, lodged with the
District Court, be included in the record on appeal.
7.

I certify:
(a)

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the Reporter;

(b)

The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record
($100) has been or will be paid contemporaneously herewith;

(c)

Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant
to IAR 20; and

(d)

That the Appellate filing fee has been paid.

DATED this

13 ;tz.,aay of January, 2010.
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451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
HAND DELIVERY

Daniel English
Clerk of the District Court
501 Government Way, Caller 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
FIRST-CLASS MAIL
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